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Original Meaning and the
Precedent Fallback
Randy J. Kozel*
There is longstanding tension between originalism and judicial
precedent. With its resolute focus on deciphering the enacted Constitution, the
originalist methodology raises questions about whether judges can legitimately
defer to their own pronouncements. Numerous scholars have responded by
debating whether and when the Constitution’s original meaning should yield to
contrary precedent.
This Article considers the role of judicial precedent not when it conflicts
with the Constitution’s original meaning but rather when the consultation of
text and historical evidence is insufficient to resolve a case. In those situations,
deference to precedent can serve as a fallback rule of constitutional
adjudication. The strengths and weaknesses of the originalist methodology take
on a unique valence when a primary commitment to original meaning is
coupled with a fallback rule of deference to precedent. Even when the
Constitution’s original meaning leaves multiple options available, falling back
on precedent can channel judicial discretion and contribute to a stable,
impersonal framework of constitutional law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The status of judicial precedent has posed a conceptual challenge
for originalism. On some accounts, the originalist methodology leaves
little room for fidelity to the pronouncements of prior courts. 1 After all,
how can a theory that is motivated by the primacy of text and historical
understandings permit deference to judicial gloss? 2

1.
See, e.g., JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT, ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD
CONSTITUTION 154 (2013) (“Originalism is often thought, by both its advocates and its critics, to
be inconsistent with precedent.”); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, and Reverse
Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1473 (2007) (describing the claim that originalists face “an
unpleasant choice: either take a principled stance with such dire implications for the rule of law
that it endangers originalism as a viable theory of interpretation, or apply an inconsistent and
unprincipled stare decisis”); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional
Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 767 (1988) (“[T]he central problem for originalism is whether
the cost of embracing stare decisis is too high—whether, in the end, the embrace destroys
originalism’s bedrock assumption that, until formally amended, the Constitution establishes a
permanent ordering binding on all organs of the government, including the courts.”).
2.
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, Rebel Without a Clause: The Irrelevance of Article VI to
Constitutional Supremacy, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 33, 38 (2011) (“The ‘judicial
Power’ is the power to decide cases in accordance with governing law. If the Constitution conflicts
with any other potentially applicable source of law, such as statutes or prior judicial
decisions . . . , the Constitution must prevail.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically
Corrupting Influence of Precedent, 22 CONST. C OMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) (“If one is an
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The apparent tension between originalism and precedent has
elicited a robust scholarly response. Recent years have witnessed
notable attempts to demonstrate that adherence to precedent, even
flawed precedent, is compatible with a commitment to the
Constitution’s original meaning under certain circumstances. 3
According to these arguments, precedent is not simply a conceptual
obstacle that justifies an exception to originalism for the sake of
practicality. 4 Rather, precedent can function as an intrinsic and
coherent part of originalist theory.
Scholarly treatments of the operation of precedent within
originalism commonly feature situations of conflict between judicial
case law and the Constitution’s original meaning.5 This emphasis is
understandable, for it reflects the importance of determining whether
originalism can accommodate widely lauded precedents even if they
represent deviations from the originalist Constitution.6 Yet there is
another set of questions relating to cases in which the Constitution’s
original meaning is uncertain. For example: How should courts respond
if the Constitution’s text, structure, and historical context leave
substantial doubt about whether corporate electioneering is part of the
originalist . . . then stare decisis, understood as a theory of adhering to prior judicial precedents
that are contrary to the original public meaning, is completely irreconcilable with originalism.”).
3.
See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 177–78 (“[W]hen an existing
precedent conflicts with the original meaning, an intermediate approach that sometimes follows
original meaning and sometimes follows precedent is best.”); Lash, supra note 1, at 1441–42 (“A
theory of stare decisis that takes into account the majoritarian commitment of popular sovereignty
may justify upholding an erroneous precedent, depending on the costs imposed on the majoritarian
political process.”); Jonathan F. Mitchell, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Text, 110 MICH. L. REV.
1, 3 (2011) (“[T]he justices may—in limited situations—use wrongly decided constitutional
precedents as rules of decision without betraying their allegiance to the enacted constitutional
text.”); Lee J. Strang, An Originalist Theory of Precedent: Originalism, Nonoriginalist Precedent,
and the Common Good, 36 N.M. L. REV. 419, 420 (2006) (“[A] limited respect is due some
nonoriginalist constitutional precedent because of the larger societal and constitutional goal of
effectively pursuing the common good.”).
4.
Contra ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
139 (1997) (“The whole function of the doctrine [of stare decisis] is to make us say that what is
false under proper analysis must nonetheless be held to be true, all in the interest of stability.”);
Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1174 (2006)
(“Rather than embracing precedent as critical to the rule of law, [Justice Scalia] views it as an
obstacle to correct constitutional interpretation.”).
5.
“Often,” but not “invariably.” Among the most notable exceptions is Caleb Nelson,
Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (2003). See infra Part V. For an
overview of several approaches to conflicts between precedent and original meaning, see Randy J.
Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1843,
1870–73 (2013).
6.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW 158 (1990) (“[I]t is too late to overrule not only the decision legalizing paper money but
also those decisions validating certain New Deal and Great Society programs pursuant to the
congressional powers over commerce, taxation, and spending.”).
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“freedom of speech” protected by the First Amendment?7 What if there
is insufficient evidence to determine whether the “right . . . to keep and
bear Arms” applies to individuals?8 Or if there is no reliable way to
figure out the application of the jury-trial right to the imposition of
mandatory-minimum sentences?9 In situations like these, is there a
meaningful role for judicial precedent to play? It is this aspect of the
relationship between originalism and stare decisis that I wish to
consider: the function of precedent when the Constitution’s original
meaning cannot confidently be discerned. 10
Focusing on situations of constitutional uncertainty underscores
the fact that deference to precedent need not come at the expense of
respecting the Constitution’s original meaning.11 Evidence of original
meaning will sometimes be inadequate to provide a clear answer to a
disputed question.12 Moreover, vague constitutional terms, even when
understood in historical context, will sometimes permit a range of
outcomes. I suggest that in such situations, originalists may consider
stare decisis as a fallback rule. Upon finding that the Constitution’s
original meaning is insufficient to resolve a dispute, courts can adopt a
presumption of deference to judicial precedent. Such a fallback rule is
compatible with several (though not all) prominent versions of
originalism. Whether one’s commitment to originalism is grounded in
the rule of law, consequentialism, or popular sovereignty, deferring to
precedent is a coherent response to constitutional uncertainty.13
From a normative perspective, this precedent fallback has much
to recommend it. Asking judges to defer to the pronouncements of their
predecessors can be a useful mechanism of judicial constraint, which is

7.
The example is drawn from Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
8.
The example is drawn from District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
9.
The example is drawn from Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
10. This Article uses the term “stare decisis” in the general sense of “[f]idelity to precedent.”
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 377 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
11. Cf. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1 at 185 (“When the original meaning is
uncertain, a far stronger argument exists for following precedent—provided that the precedent
constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the original meaning—than when the precedent clearly
conflicts with the original meaning.”).
12. My claims are intended to apply equally to (a) original meaning as defined in terms of
the original intentions of some relevant set of constitutional framers and ratifiers and (b) original
meaning as defined by the original public meaning of the Constitution’s text at the time of
ratification. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 N W.
U. L. REV. 923, 926–34 (2009) (summarizing the competing approaches). I take no position
regarding which definition of original meaning is superior. Further, my focus on situations of
constitutional uncertainty makes the distinction less salient. Cf. Nelson, supra note 5, at 557
(contending that “in the very cases where divisions among the framers and ratifiers make the
‘original intention’ indeterminate, the ‘original meaning’ is likely to be similarly indeterminate”).
13. See infra Part IV.B.
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a value that many originalists have long prized. 14 To some critics of
originalism, the constraint argument is “naïve” due to the
“fragmentariness and contestability of the historical record.”15 A related
challenge has arisen within the originalist school itself. The source of
the challenge is the movement to distinguish between the interpretation
of the Constitution’s linguistic meaning and the construction of
constitutional law. Decoupling the steps of interpretation and
construction implies that within the “construction zone,”16 there can be
a range of outcomes from which a judge must select on some basis other
than the semantic meaning of constitutional text.17 In the view of one
recent commentator, “[t]he very changes that make” the constructionbased approach “theoretically defensible also strip it of any pretense of
a power to constrain judges to a meaningful degree.”18
Fidelity to judicial precedent responds to both lines of criticism.
When the implications of constitutional text and historical evidence are
uncertain, judges need not receive license to decide cases according to
their subjective intuitions. A primary commitment to original meaning
can be coupled with a secondary preference for judicial precedent,
including nonoriginalist precedent. Stare decisis becomes a

14. See id.
15. Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 89 (2009); see also Eric
Berger, Originalism’s Pretenses, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 329, 331 (2013) (“Whatever its
merits . . . originalism often cannot fulfill its promises of fixation and constraint.”); Thomas B.
Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 723 (2011) (recounting the criticism
that “it is often impossible to determine the actual original understanding of a particular
constitutional provision . . . because the historical record is contradictory, incomplete, or severely
compromised” (footnotes omitted)); Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV.
2011, 2015 (2012) (describing originalism as harboring “pretensions of objectivity and
determinacy”); David A. Strauss, Why Conservatives Shouldn’t Be Originalists, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 969, 970 (2008) (“[O]riginalism, contrary to appearances, in fact imposes only a very
uncertain limit on judges and leaves them a great deal of latitude to find, in the original
understandings, the outcomes they want to find.”).
16. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT.
95, 108 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional
Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64
FLA. L. REV. 1485, 1509 (2012) (arguing that “the originalist construction school . . . permits the
very results that originalism was designed to avoid—namely, the unrestrained judicial trumping
of democratically authorized decision making and the implementation of textual understandings
of which those alive at the time of ratification would have been totally unaware.”); Lawrence B.
Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 502–03 (2013) (“If
one were attracted to originalism because one was opposed to unconstrained judicial discretion in
constitutional cases, then the notion of a construction zone in which judicial decisions were
unconstrained . . . would be worrisome.”).
18. Colby, supra note 15, at 714; see also Dorf, supra note 15, at 2014 (“[N]ew originalists
may rely on the relative open-endedness of original meaning in order to justify results that comport
with their values.”).
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supplemental constraint on judges when the Constitution’s original
meaning is in doubt.
Falling back on precedent can also contribute to the stability and
impersonality of constitutional law. Once again, these are values that
many originalists have embraced.19 A commitment to originalism
coheres with skepticism about judicial updating of the Constitution.20
When the original meaning is uncertain, deference to judicial precedent
can reinforce a similar principle. Combining a primary commitment to
original meaning with a precedent fallback promotes a conception of
constitutional law as enduring over time and transcending the
proclivities of individual jurists. Further, invoking precedent in
response to uncertainty has a basis in America’s constitutional history:
Leading scholars have contended that figures such as James Madison
posited that uncertainties in the Constitution’s text would be
“liquidated” through, among other things, the creation of judicial
precedent.21 Against this backdrop, the case for falling back on
precedent draws force from history as well as normative
argumentation.
For originalism’s proponents, the primary implication of this
analysis is that the precedent fallback is worthy of consideration as a
tool for enhancing the methodology’s effectiveness and appeal. For
originalism’s critics, the analysis suggests that neither incompatibility
with precedent nor inability to constrain is an inherent defect of
originalist theory. Many versions of originalism are fully consistent
with the precedent fallback. Or so I claim.
What I do not claim (for present purposes) is that the precedent
fallback is superior to other potential means of responding to
constitutional uncertainty. Commentators have offered a variety of
proposals for how judges should behave when the inquiry into the
Constitution’s original meaning is inconclusive. The options include
deferring to the political branches of government, protecting individual
liberty, and consulting the methods by which the Founding generation
expected judges to react to textual and contextual uncertainty. 22 The
respective arguments in favor of those positions are comprehensive (and
insightful). My goal in this Article is far more modest: I hope to
demonstrate that, within the originalist school, deference to precedent
deserves consideration as a possible response to constitutional
uncertainty. What I am after, in short, is a particular way of thinking
19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part IV.D.
See id.
See infra Part VI.E.
See infra Part VI.B.
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about precedent—one that views precedent as a source of value rather
than a conceptual obstacle that originalism must overcome or explain
away.23
Finally, though I return to the issue below, I note that my
analysis does not depend on any single definition of constitutional
“uncertainty” or constitutional “indeterminacy.”24 The question of
where to set the bar for establishing constitutional certainty is crucial
to the precedent fallback’s operation because it determines when a
judge should shift her focus from constitutional text and history to
judicial precedent. Nevertheless, the precedent fallback maintains the
same shape regardless of how the concept of constitutional uncertainty
is defined.25
This Article begins in Part II by examining the normative
overlap of stare decisis and originalism on three key issues:
constraining judicial discretion, contributing to doctrinal stability, and
promoting the impersonality of law. Part III offers a brief clarification
of the various roles that precedent can play within originalist
adjudication. Part IV explains how a fallback rule of deference to
precedent coheres with several versions of originalism that are
prominent in the literature. Part V then considers various questions
about the mechanics of the precedent fallback, including its
defeasibility, its treatment of recent cases as compared with older ones,
and its application to nonoriginalist reasoning. I suggest that, while the
precedent fallback prescribes definitive answers to the latter two
questions, it does not require any particular view of the countervailing
circumstances that justify departures from precedent.
Part VI addresses the argument that constitutional adjudication
is best understood as consisting of discrete steps of interpretation and
construction. For those who emphasize such a distinction, the precedent
fallback can be reconceptualized as a principle of constitutional
construction. Precedent can also serve as a bridge between theories that

23. It is worth noting that this Article makes no attempt to defend or criticize the originalist
methodology as a general matter. My goal is simply to contribute to the existing account of
originalism’s relationship with judicial precedent.
24. Technically speaking, it may be more accurate to say “underdeterminacy” rather than
“indeterminacy” because the Constitution’s text and original meaning will always take some
options off the table. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462, 473 (1987) (“The law is indeterminate with respect to a given case
if and only if the set of results in the case that can be squared with the legal materials is identical
with the set of all imaginable results.”). Nevertheless, for expositional ease and syllabic savings, I
will use the term “indeterminacy” in the sense of “uncertainty,” with the understanding that the
term (as I use it here) means that multiple options—as opposed to all conceivable options—are left
open by the Constitution’s linguistic meaning.
25. See infra Part V.A.
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endorse the practice of constitutional construction and theories that
urge the resolution of constitutional uncertainty through interpretive
methods that were recognized at the time of ratification. Finally, Part
VII discusses three remaining questions raised by my analysis: whether
deferring to nonoriginalist precedents poses a threat to originalism;
whether fidelity to precedent limits the discretion of later judges only
by amplifying the discretion of earlier ones; and whether the
evidentiary bar for establishing the Constitution’s original meaning
should be set high or low.
II. PRECEDENT AND ORIGINAL MEANING AS
COMPLEMENTARY CONCEPTS
Despite their well-chronicled tension, originalism and stare
decisis can converge in the values they pursue. I begin by exploring
these areas of common ground.
A. Constraint, Stability, and Impersonality
A constrained judge is one whose discretion is confined by
preexisting determinants of legal meaning.26 At base, constraint entails
nothing more than a commitment that limits the subsequent exercise
of judgment. Even a judge who decides a First Amendment case by
reference to her own personal commitment to (for example) individual
liberty is in some sense constrained in her decisionmaking. The same is
true for all other interpretive touchstones. 27 Precommitment to any
adjudicative theory implies a degree of constraint.28
Yet constraints can be particularly effective when they emanate
from an external, publicly available source.29 Publication can enhance
the clarity with which constraints are understood and fortify them
against distortion in future cases. 30 And while constraints are only
26. I follow Thomas Colby in defining judicial “constraint” as relating to “the discretion of
judges.” Colby, supra note 15, at 751. So defined, the concept of constraint is distinct from judicial
“restraint . . . in the sense of deference to legislative majorities.” Id.
27. Cf. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 40 (1999) (“[M]ost interpretive approaches can at least
constrain judges within bounds and in all likelihood could provide greater constraints over time
as techniques of application are worked out in practice.”).
28. See id. at 39 (“[T]he adoption of any interpretive method constrains judges from engaging
in arbitrary or willful behavior.”).
29. Cf. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 6 (1971) (“[A] legitimate Court must be controlled by principles exterior to the will of the
Justices”); id. at 7 (discussing the need to “protect the judge from the intrusion of his own values”).
30. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 C ONST. COMMENT. 271, 274–75 (2005) (“Restrained judges render decisions that
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made necessary by the pressures to defy them, sources of constraint
that are available for public scrutiny are better designed to retain their
shape even in the difficult cases, when a judge’s internal
precommitments might otherwise give way to case-specific impulses.
The key is the heightened prospect of accountability: when constraints
are publicly accessible, there is a “basis of legal accountability for the
power” exercised by those “in positions of authority.”31
In a similar way, the externality of legal constraints can bolster
the degree to which the judiciary demonstrates itself as principled and
consistent.32 It is one thing for a judge to give assurances that she will
make decisions in accordance with her internal interpretive
commitments. It is quite another thing for the judge to empower
onlookers to reach their own conclusions regarding the compatibility of
her decisions with articulated sources of legal meaning.33 Jeremy
Bentham suggested that the difference between a “cloak” and a “check”
is publicity.34 The same principle explains the value of external
constraints.
Judicial constraint, particularly constraint that flows from a
publicly available source, has been an animating force for many
originalists. 35 Emblematic is the position of Justice Scalia, who
contends that by “establish[ing] a historical criterion that is
conceptually quite separate from the preferences of the judge himself,”
originalism cabins judicial discretion.36 Justice Scalia has argued that,
by focusing on predefined, external sources of meaning, originalism
avoids “judicial personalization of the law” and establishes itself as “the
lesser evil” among interpretive methodologies. 37 More recently, he used
his concurrence in McDonald v. City of Chicago as occasion to reiterate
conform to what an experienced lawyer, familiar with the facts of the case and the relevant legal
authorities, would counsel a client would be the most likely outcome.”).
31. Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2012).
32. Cf. WHITTINGTON , supra note 27, at 39 (“Originalism is said to offer at least a
comparative advantage in being able to constrain judges by providing fairly objective and specific
criteria by which to evaluate judicial performance.”).
33. See, e.g., HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 569 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994) (noting the importance of “facilitating the operation of the check of professional criticism”).
34. 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827), quoted in Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
35. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 6, at 146 (“When a judge finds his principle in the Constitution
as originally understood, the problem of the neutral derivation of principle is solved . . . . He need
not, and must not, make unguided value judgments of his own.”); Colby, supra note 15, at 714
(“Originalism was born of a desire to constrain judges.” (footnote omitted)).
36. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
37. Id. at 863–64.
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that “the question to be decided is not whether the historically focused
method is a perfect means of restraining aristocratic judicial
Constitution-writing; but whether it is the best means available in an
imperfect world.”38
Comparable arguments are salient within the academic
commentary. Lawrence Solum has explained that one of the central
tenets uniting different strands of originalism is the belief that
“constitutional actors,” including judges, “ought to be constrained by the
original meaning when they engage in constitutional practice.”39 Randy
Barnett’s theory of constitutional legitimacy is likewise bound up with
the importance of constraint: because “a written constitution is the
means by which law is imposed on those who would impose law on the
general public,” it follows that judges may not alter the Constitution’s
“meaning at their own discretion.”40 In Professor Barnett’s view, the
Constitution is designed to “lock-in” rights and “define” and “limit” the
power of government.41 Such is the language of constraint.42
In much the same way, judicial constraint can be linked with
fidelity to precedent. As Alexander Hamilton wrote, in a passage the
Supreme Court has endorsed,43 deference to precedent is a means of
preventing the enterprise of judging from becoming the province of “an
arbitrary discretion.”44 John Adams also looked to precedent as
displacing “the arbitrary Will or uninformed Reason of Prince or
Judge.”45 To similar effect is William Blackstone’s contrast of deference
to precedent with a judge’s disposition of cases “according to his private
sentiments.”46 And these concerns continue to reverberate, as in Justice

38. 561 U.S. 742, 804 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. (“I think it beyond all serious
dispute that it is much less subjective, and intrudes much less upon the democratic process.”);
BORK, supra note 6, at 155 (“No other method of constitutional adjudication can confine courts to
a defined sphere of authority and thus prevent them from assuming powers whose exercise alters,
perhaps radically, the design of the American Republic.”).
39. Solum, supra note 17, at 456.
40. Randy E. Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103
NW. U. L. REV. 615, 637 (2009).
41. Id. at 658; see also Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted”
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 18 (2006) (“[A] written constitution can perform neither the
‘lock-in’ or rights-protecting functions if those who are supposed to be bound and limited by its
terms may alter their meaning at their discretion.”).
42. See also, e.g., WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 6 (“[T]he Constitution is binding only to
the extent that judges do not have discretion in its application.”).
43. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172 (1989).
44. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
45. John Adams, Draft correspondence to a newspaper, November 5, 1760, in 1 THE ADAMS
PAPERS: DIARY AND AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF JOHN ADAMS 167 (L. H. Butterfield ed., 1961).
46. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69; see also id. (“[H]e being sworn to
determine, not according to his own private judgment, but according to the known laws and
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Scalia’s statement that to “disregard our own precedent” in the absence
of other guideposts is to “leav[e] only our own consciences to constrain
our discretion.”47 A host of commentators have likewise underscored the
constraining force of precedent.48
At the outset, then, we find adherence to original meaning and
adherence to judicial precedent sharing a normative foundation. Both
are mechanisms for ensuring that judges are constrained by a publicly
available source that is external to themselves. 49 For its proponents,
originalism provides a means of “fixing [the] will” of judges within
certain bounds.50 Fidelity to precedent promotes the same objective.51
Within a system that generally treats caselaw as relevant, judges face
meaningful limits on their ability to disregard precedent. 52
Accompanying those limits is a heightened burden of justification for
departing from precedent. 53
customs of the land . . . .”). But see id. at 69–70 (“Yet this rule admits of exception, where the former
determination is most evidently contrary to reason; much more if it be contrary to the divine law.”).
47. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 673 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
48. See Merrill, supra note 30, at 278 (“[A]t least in theory, a strong theory of
precedent . . . will result in more judicial restraint . . . in the context of modern American
constitutional law”); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1, 83–84 (2001) (“[S]tare decisis grew in America as a way to restrain . . . the discretion
that occupies the space left by the indeterminacy of the underlying rules of decision.”); David A.
Strauss, Originalism, Precedent, and Candor, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 299, 300 (2005) (“Precedent
limits judges in constitutional cases just as it has for a long time limited judges in cases about
contracts, torts, and property.”); cf. Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage:
Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 155, 169–70 (2006) (“The core idea of formalism is that the law (constitutions, statues,
regulations, and precedent) provides rules and that these rules can, do, and should provide a public
standard for what is lawful (or not).”).
49. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A
Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269,
1292 (1997) (noting that “text and original understanding” and “precedent” are all “constraints on
judicial discretion” that serve “as means of tempering judicial arrogance by forcing judges to
confront, and take into account, the opinions of others”).
50. Cf. WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 56 (“The people can constrain their governmental
agents only by fixing their will in an unchanging text.”).
51. See Christopher J. Peters, Originalism, Stare Decisis, and Constitutional Authority, in
PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 222 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013) (“Stare
decisis can promote the perception of impartiality by visibly preventing the Court from reaching
its preferred result.”); Thomas W. Merrill, The Conservative Case for Precedent, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 977, 981 (2008) (“A judiciary that stood firm with a strong theory of precedent would
rechannel our nation back toward democratic institutions and away from using the courts to make
social policy.”).
52. Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 21 (2008) (drawing on
the work of H.L.A. Hart in stating that “[w]hen judges follow precedents they do so not because
they fear the imposition of a sanction, but because precedent-following is regarded among them as
correct practice, as a norm, deviation from which is likely to be viewed negatively”).
53. See id. at 165 (“Precedent, particularly accumulated precedent, can place a significant
justificatory burden on those minded to decide differently on the same facts.”).
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A related area of conceptual overlap concerns the value of
judicial impersonality. Originalism is commonly defended as promoting
the ideal that the law itself, not the man or woman who dons the judicial
robe, should determine the resolution of legal disputes. 54 Adjudication
is the province of overarching, durable legal commands that transcend
any particular dispute and resist the subjective vagaries of judicial
personality.55 “Judges,” Keith Whittington asserts, “are not simply
private citizens well positioned to prevent public harm.”56 Only when
judges subordinate their subjective impulses to the enacted
Constitution can impersonality flourish.57
The doctrine of stare decisis can promote similar ideals. The
Supreme Court has explained that stare decisis facilitates “impersonal
and reasoned judgments”58 and contributes to the maintenance of a
legal system in which “bedrock principles are founded in the law rather
than in the proclivities of individuals.”59 Stare decisis thus emerges
from, and contributes to, “a conception of a court continuing over
time.”60 The doctrine’s promotion of impersonality is bound up with its
substantive neutrality: at its core, stare decisis is committed to no
agenda other than respect for whatever has gone before.61
The overlap between original meaning and stare decisis also
extends to the promotion of stability. Adherence to the Constitution’s
original meaning can enhance stability by reducing the incidence of
54. Cf. Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. REV. 165,
211 (2008) (including among the features of the rule of law that “governmental authority . . . be
impersonal, residing in offices rather than in individuals”).
55. See, e.g., Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 N W. U. L. REV. 226, 288 (1988) (“The
outstanding characteristic of original intentions adjudication, for good or ill, is that it is, compared
with the alternative methods, most likely to produce relatively clear and stable rules for lawful
government activity.”); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism 129 (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Research Papers, Series No. 07-24, 2008), available at, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120244, archived at http://perma.cc/FW7-QM33 (stating that a “familiar
justification for originalism is based on the great value of the rule of law and its associated values,
predictability, certainty, and stability of legal rules”).
56. WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 140.
57. See BORK, supra note 6, at 318 (“Though there are many who vehemently oppose
[originalism], that philosophy is essential if courts are to govern according to the rule of law rather
than whims of politics and personal preference.”).
58. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970).
59. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265 (1986); see also Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis
and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 288 (1990) (arguing that the rule of law
depends on combating the idea that “the Constitution is nothing more than what five Justices say
it is”).
60. Michael C. Dorf, Prediction and the Rule of Law, 42 UCLA L. REV. 651, 683 (1995).
61. Cf. John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE L.J. 503,
540 (2000) (“The basic principle itself is substantively neutral as to possible answers because it
simply embraces the judicial answer that came first in time.”).
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judicially initiated change. And deference to precedent ensures that the
frequent reconsideration of judicial decisions will not “threaten to
substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal
stability.”62 It is that stability, the Supreme Court has stated, “upon
which the rule of law depends.”63 The aspiration is to establish the legal
system as a framework of durable rules rather than “a series of
unconnected outcomes.”64 At the same time, deference to precedent can
protect the settled expectations of those who have acted and made plans
in reliance on judicial pronouncements.65 The importance of a stable
backdrop is another consideration that implicates both fidelity to
original meanings and fidelity to judicial precedent.66
B. The Promise and Reality of Precedent
A bad doctrine of stare decisis is little better than none at all. A
doctrine that is ill-defined or excessively weak will lead not to
constraint and predictability but to cynicism that the law is being
applied in good faith. Rather than confidence that judges are acting as
part of a unified judiciary, appeals to stare decisis will breed suspicion
of rhetorical cover in service of individual agendas. Yet the promise of
stare decisis remains integral to American constitutional practice.67
The Supreme Court has gone so far as to describe the doctrine of stare
decisis as “indispensable” to the rule of law.68 And there are many
62. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 139 (2008).
63. CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 457 (2008); see also Nelson, supra note 48,
at 4 (noting the argument that “the primary purpose of stare decisis is to protect the rule of law by
avoiding an endless series of changes in judicial decisions”).
64. Farber, supra note 4, at 1179.
65. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 906 (2007)
(“To be sure, reliance on a judicial opinion is a significant reason to adhere to it.”); Quill Corp. v.
North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 317 (1992) (retaining a precedent that had “engendered substantial
reliance and . . . become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry”); BORK, supra note 6, at
157 (“Governments need to know their powers, and citizens need to know their rights; expectations
about either should not lightly be upset.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential
Disagreement, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1722–23 (2013) (“Stare decisis protects reliance interests by
putting newly ascendant coalitions at an institutional disadvantage.”).
66. Notwithstanding the conceptual overlap, the reliance implications of originalism and
stare decisis may be at odds if a judicial precedent has commanded substantial reliance despite its
deviation from the Constitution’s original meaning. Even so, my point is simply that the
underlying impulses in favor of promoting reliance and stability are compatible with originalism
and stare decisis alike.
67. See supra Part II.A.
68. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very concept of
the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect
for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.”); see also Welch v. Tex. Dep’t of Highways & Pub.
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 478–79 (1987) (asserting that “[t]he rule of law depends in large part on
adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis”).
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examples in which precedent does seem to play a meaningful role, from
high-profile disputes in the Supreme Court69 to cases in which lower
courts heed closely to Supreme Court holdings (and even dicta).70
Still, the modern doctrine of stare decisis arguably lacks the
structure and certainty to yield significant benefits, at least with
respect to the Supreme Court’s “horizontal” treatment of its own
precedents. Part of the explanation owes to the fact that the Court has
described its doctrine as a “series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations.”71 The resulting fluidity impedes consistent application
across cases. Another problem arises from the continuing debates—not
simply as a matter of jurisprudential theory, but within Supreme Court
opinions—over what it means to follow precedent.72 And a third reason
why the doctrine of stare decisis can seem uncertain and ad hoc is a
simple matter of growing pains: although the concept of stare decisis
has a long lineage, the Court’s attempts to “doctrinalize” the treatment
of precedent are of more recent vintage.73
Notwithstanding these challenges, my working assumption in
this Article is that there is some hope yet for precedent. For the reasons
explained in the previous Section, the doctrine of stare decisis has the
potential to produce substantial benefits in terms of constraint,
stability, and impersonality.74 In the following Parts, I presuppose a
doctrine that is sufficiently stable and determinate to facilitate
coherent and principled application. The extent to which the existing
doctrine resembles that ideal is another matter.75

69. I would hold up Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443–44 (2000), which
reaffirmed the rule of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), as one prominent example.
70. See Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 198–99 (2014).
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
72. See Kozel, supra note 70, at 202–20 (discussing the complexity of formulating and
applying a consistent definition of precedential scope).
73. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis
Require Adherence to the Supreme Court’s Current Doctrine of Stare Decisis?, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1165,
1168–69 (2008) (describing the 1992 decision in Casey as “the Supreme Court’s first systematic
attempt to set forth a general theory of the role of precedent and ‘stare decisis’ in constitutional
adjudication”).
74. See supra Part II.A; cf. MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 189 (“[W]e believe that
questions of precedent should be settled by rules, not by open-ended balancing tests, because of
the advantages in terms of predictability and constraint that rules confer.”).
75. For an evaluation of the Supreme Court’s existing doctrine of stare decisis against a
backdrop of interpretive disagreement, see Randy J. Kozel, Second-Best Stare Decisis, CALIF. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2498125&download=yes, archived at http://perma.cc/VBL5-LC3R.
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III. FUNCTIONS OF PRECEDENT WITHIN ORIGINALISM
There are several potential functions of precedent within
originalism. My focus on the use of precedent as a fallback rule captures
just one of those functions. To clarify the nature of my argument, I begin
with a brief overview of other ways in which an originalist judge might
invoke precedent.76
1. Historical Precedent. A judge may consult precedent to help
determine the most accurate interpretation of the Constitution’s
original meaning. Judicial precedent becomes one of several tools—
which also include constitutional text and structure, as well as evidence
about historical usage—that can lend meaning to an otherwise
uncertain provision. The reason for consulting precedent is not that
there is anything special about judicial case law; it is the recognition
that precedent can sometimes assist judges in conducting the historical
inquiry that originalism entails.
Such uses of precedent are relatively benign in terms of their
theoretical coherence with originalism. One can certainly imagine
objections to the reliability of judicial precedents as indicia of the
Constitution’s original meaning. But those objections deal with
originalist technique. They do not raise any deeper question about the
legitimacy of consulting precedent within an originalist framework.
2. Epistemic Precedent. The second use of precedent is related to
the first. A judge who is attempting to resolve a constitutional case may
defer to a prior opinion because she suspects that it is likely to embody
the correct interpretation of the Constitution’s original meaning.77 Of
course, this “epistemic”78 use of precedent will extend only to “previous
decisions that actually attempted to discern original meaning.”79
76. For further exploration of various uses of precedent within originalism, see Lee J. Strang,
An Originalist Theory of Precedent: The Privileged Place of Originalist Precedent, 2010 BYU L.
REV. 1729, 1766–67 (distinguishing between situations in which “[o]riginalist precedent provides
evidence of how the original meaning is connected to and governs the activity under its purview”
and situations in which “[o]riginalist precedent . . . determines the Constitution’s meaning”
through the process of construction).
77. See, e.g., MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 187 (“Precedent may . . . appropriately
change a judge’s prior beliefs about the correct interpretation, just as the opinion of an expert
appropriately changes the prior beliefs of decision makers about the conclusion to which the expert
testifies.”).
78. Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 43
(2000) (“The Court may presumptively adhere to its past constitutional precedents not because
precedent, right or wrong, binds, but because precedent can teach and help find the right answer.”).
79. Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 257, 267 (2005); see also MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at
187 (“Many cases have deserved no weight on epistemic grounds because they have not attempted
to derive their results from the Constitution’s original meaning.”).
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3. Conflicting Precedent. Respect for precedent may drive a judge
to make a conscious choice to depart from the Constitution’s original
meaning in pursuit of other values such as the promotion of stability
and the protection of reliance expectations. As I suggested above, there
is a wealth of thoughtful commentary about this practice, and scholars
differ greatly over the situations (if any) in which an overt decision to
depart from the Constitution’s original meaning is justifiable.80
4. Fallback Precedent. The fourth use of judicial precedent, and
the one that will be my focus, is a step removed from following precedent
notwithstanding its conflict with the Constitution’s original meaning.
When a judge determines that her inquiry into text, structure, and
history is unavailing, she might defer to precedent despite the fact that
it does not shed any light on the Constitution’s original meaning. The
judge would conclude that, in the absence of textual and historical
clarity, the best approach is to adopt a presumption of stare decisis.
That is the use of precedent that I describe as the precedent fallback.
5. Methodological Precedent. To complete the taxonomy, let us
briefly consider a final use of precedent that involves the process for
discerning the Constitution’s original meaning. Interpreting the
historical record is a complex task, and it stands to reason that different
judges will sometimes have different perspectives about how best to do
it. Against that backdrop, we might imagine a judge who defers to her
predecessors’ choices regarding the process for interpreting the
Constitution’s language in historical context. The judge might defer to
her predecessors’ determination that a particular historical account is
more reliable than others, or that a particular dictionary or newspaper
is the best indicator of contemporary usage, or so forth.
The crucial question is why the subsequent judge sees fit to
defer. If she believes that her predecessors’ choices of materials and
procedures are likely to be better than her own, then we are back in the
realm of using precedent to achieve the most accurate interpretation of
the Constitution’s original meaning. By contrast, if the subsequent
judge thinks that her predecessors actually made the wrong choice by
emphasizing a source that is less reliable than some others, to follow
precedent would be to prioritize case law notwithstanding its conflict
with the Constitution’s original meaning.
What if our judge surveys a variety of historical sources that
point in different directions before concluding that there is no strong
reason for believing that any is more reliable than the others? May the
judge select the source that is consistent with existing case law? At first
blush, there may not appear to be anything objectionable about this
80.

For an introduction, see Kozel, supra note 5, at 1870–73.
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practice; the judge must do something, after all, so why not select the
historical source that is consistent with precedent? Nevertheless, when
a judge determines that competing historical accounts are equally
plausible, it follows that the meaning of the relevant constitutional
provision is uncertain. If using precedent as a tiebreaker is legitimate,
it must be because stare decisis is a permissible fallback rule.
IV. INTEGRATING PRECEDENT WITH ORIGINALISM
Some judges and commentators contend that the Constitution’s
original meaning is frequently so opaque or inconclusive as to impose
little constraint on courts.81 Justice Stevens has argued that “[e]ven
when historical analysis is focused on a discrete proposition . . . the
evidence often points in different directions.”82 In reality, “a limitless
number of subjective judgments may be smuggled into” what purports
to be historical analysis.83 David Strauss similarly concludes that
“[o]riginalism, as applied to the controversial provisions of the U.S.
Constitution, is shot through with indeterminacy.”84 For Professor
Strauss, originalism’s lack of constraining force is one reason why the
methodology is inferior to alternative theories such as common-law
constitutionalism. 85
But notice what happens when the constraining effect of original
meaning—whether one believes that effect to be substantial or
meager—is paired with the constraining effect of precedent. A judge
might well conclude that the Constitution’s original meaning is unclear
as it pertains to a particular dispute. Yet if the judge responds by
adhering to precedent, she is still acting in accordance with external,
publicly available sources of law. A judge who falls back on precedent
81. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 15, at 89 (“Given the fragmentariness and contestability of
the historical record, the Originalist judge has substantial discretion, a point at which professional
historians have long hammered.”); Peters, supra note 51, at 195 (“In our actual world, originalist
methodology is neither especially transparent nor especially determinate.”); Strauss, supra note
15, at 970 (“Partly this is just a technical problem of becoming conversant with all the relevant
materials. But the greater problem is knowing what inferences to draw from those historical
materials.”).
82. McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 907 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id.
(“The historian must choose which pieces to credit and which to discount, and then must try to
assemble them into a coherent whole.”).
83. Id. at 908.
84. DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 45 (2010).
85. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 15, at 973 (“Judges pick and choose among precedents, often
overrule precedents, and follow precedent uncertainly. But it seems to me that originalism is much
more manipulable. As a practical matter, precedent closes off many options.” (footnote omitted));
cf. Colby, supra note 15, at 764 (“The New Originalism is . . . no more constraining than other
theories of constitutional interpretation. And it may even be less constraining.”).

122

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1:105

accordingly finds added insulation against the claim that originalism is
too indeterminate to be constraining. Even when original meaning is
inadequate to settle a matter, the judge can be constrained by
precedent.86 The combination of precedent and original meaning yields
a “thicker” body of norms to guide the process of adjudication than does
originalism alone.87 Viewed in isolation, originalism and precedent both
aspire to limit judicial discretion. When the two are combined, their
constraining power is amplified.
Much the same is true of the values of stability and
impersonality. An approach to constitutional law that demands
adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning will achieve a certain
degree of stability. But adhering to precedent in situations of
constitutional uncertainty will go further in lending stability to the law.
And a judge who subordinates her individual preferences to the
Constitution’s textual commands can create even more distance
between her own preferences and the content of the law by deferring to
precedent when those commands are uncertain.
Still, none of these benefits is relevant if deference to precedent
is conceptually inconsistent with a commitment to originalism. To
explore that possibility, let us examine the precedent fallback’s
compatibility with several prominent strands of originalist theory.88
A. Rule of Law Originalism
Begin with the argument that a paramount dedication to the
rule of law justifies the adoption of originalism.89 The central idea is
that the original meaning of the Constitution’s text is better than
competing methodologies at requiring judges to decide cases based on a
predefined, external source of legal rules. In addition, applying the
original meaning of the Constitution satisfies the requirement of
nonarbitrariness; that is, originalism does not resemble decisionmaking
processes such as coin flips, which might be fully constraining but which

86. See Peters, supra note 51, at 223 (“[T]he best way to enhance the determinacy of
constitutional law is likely to be the very system of stare decisis that many originalists distrust.”).
87. Merrill, supra note 51, at 980; see also id. (“At this stage in our legal evolution, precedent
provides more law to draw upon in supplementing the language of the Constitution than do
originalist sources.”).
88. See Lash, supra note 1, at 1440 (“Because originalism is an interpretive method and not
a normative constitutional theory, different originalists advance different normative grounds for
their interpretive approach.”).
89. See Primus, supra note 54, at 211 (“The rule of law is a fundamental constitutional value,
and many theorists have argued that the rule of law requires originalism.”).
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nonetheless would flout the rule of law.90 Even if other theories, such as
pragmatism or common-law constitutionalism, are plausible modes of
interpretation, the argument goes, originalism is superior due to its rule
of law effects.
Accepting the rule of law defense of originalism does not require
applying the Constitution’s original meaning in every case. A
prominent illustration of this point comes from the writings of Justice
Scalia, who has described deference to precedent as a “pragmatic
exception” to originalism that is grounded in the desire to maintain
stability.91 Justice Scalia’s willingness to depart from original meaning
for the sake of upholding precedent has drawn sharp criticism from
originalists and nonoriginalists alike.92 But his position can be fortified
through a reconceptualization. Justice Scalia’s depiction of precedent
can be reframed to emphasize an underlying focus on the rule of law. 93
Fidelity to precedent may sometimes create costs for the rule of law by
supplanting democratically enacted mandates with (mistaken) judicial
gloss.94 Yet deference to precedent can also yield rule of law benefits by
enhancing continuity and avoiding disruption. Putting these features
together, one might understand originalism as demanding adherence to
the Constitution’s original meaning unless the competing rule of law
costs of deviating from precedent exceed some threshold. Rather than a
pragmatic exception to originalism, deference to precedent becomes an
outgrowth of the same devotion to the rule of law that justifies
originalism in the first place.
The foregoing paragraphs raise the familiar concern with
whether stare decisis presents a conceptual obstacle for originalism by
counseling adherence to decisions that stray from the Constitution’s

90. Cf. id. at 215 (“The rule ‘Always award judgment to the defendant’ is highly constraining,
but following it is not a good way to reach substantively valid rulings.”).
91. SCALIA, supra note 4, at 140; see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING
LAW 413–14 (2012) (“Stare decisis . . . is not a part of textualism. It is an exception to textualism
(as it is to any theory of interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity.”).
92. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION 231 (2012) (“If the
touchstone here is pure practicality, it is hard to see why pure practicality cannot also be the
touchstone for all issues of constitutional interpretation across the board . . . .”); Barnett, supra
note 41, at 7 (arguing that Justice Scalia is “not really an originalist at all” for reasons including
his view of precedent); Reva B. Siegel, Heller and Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and
Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1409 (2009) (“Deferring to non-originalist precedent dilutes
originalism and makes it a nakedly discretionary practice . . . .”).
93. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI . L. REV. 1175, 1179–80
(1989) (“Rudimentary justice requires that those subject to the law must have the means of
knowing what it prescribes. . . . Only by announcing rules do we hedge ourselves in.”).
94. Cf. Nelson, supra note 48, at 61–62 (noting the argument that a willingness to reconsider
precedent “promotes ‘democratic values’ by bringing the law enforced in court closer to the
collective judgments that our representatives have authoritatively expressed”).
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original meaning. Precedent’s potential value as an asset for originalism
moves to the forefront when there is no such conflict because the
Constitution’s original meaning is obscured by vague language or
inadequate historical evidence. In those situations, a theory of
originalism that is grounded in the rule of law is compatible with a
fallback rule of deference to precedent. When it comes to privileging
external determinants of legal meaning over subjective judgments, a
judge who resolves a dispute based on her best reading of precedent
closely resembles a judge who resolves it based on her best
interpretation of the Constitution’s original meaning. Stare decisis thus
delivers some of the same rule of law benefits as scrupulous fidelity to
text and history.
It certainly does not follow that judicial identity is rendered
irrelevant to the adjudicative process.95 Different judges will
occasionally reach different conclusions regarding the implications of
precedent, just as they will occasionally adopt different interpretations
of the historical record. Umpires are people, too.96 Still, the consultation
of precedent, like the consultation of original meaning, will require the
judge to move beyond her own intuitions to apply predefined, publicly
accessible legal rules. The effect is to leverage the disciplining power of
precedent within an originalist framework. From this perspective, the
choice between constraint by original meanings and constraint by
judicial precedents is not a choice at all; it is a matter of “and” rather
than “or.”
B. Consequentialist Originalism
A second illustration of precedent’s interplay with original
meaning involves versions of originalism that are grounded in
consequentialist analysis. For consequentialists such as John McGinnis
and Michael Rappaport, the primary reason for adhering to the
Constitution’s original meaning is the belief that legal rules that were
created through the supermajoritarian ratification process will tend to
deliver desirable results. 97 Consequentialism presumes that the
95. Cf. Dorf, supra note 60, at 685 (“To acknowledge the impersonal ideal of law does not
require that one deny that an individual judge’s experiences, education, temperament, and values
often play a decisive role in her resolution of cases.”).
96. The reference to “umpires” is drawn from then-Judge John Roberts’s testimony during
his Supreme Court confirmation hearings. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John
G. Roberts, Jr., To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they
apply them.”).
97. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 19 (“First, we maintain that a good or
desirable constitution is one that promotes the welfare of the people and that such a constitution
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Constitution’s original meaning should be implemented,98 but the
theory allows for the elevation of precedent over original meaning under
certain circumstances. For example, when a flawed (in originalist
terms) precedent has come to receive supermajoritarian support, its
retention on grounds of stare decisis is justifiable.99 Likewise, if a
precedent’s overruling would generate extraordinary costs, the
precedent may be retained despite its deviation from the Constitution’s
original meaning.100 The driving objective for consequentialists is “to
use the original meaning when it produces greater net benefits than
precedent and to use precedent when the reverse holds true.”101
A focus on cost-benefit analysis also aligns consequentialism
with deference to precedent in situations where the Constitution’s
original meaning is uncertain. As a threshold matter, Professors
McGinnis and Rappaport argue that “the Founding generation expected
precedent to apply to, and continue after, the Constitution,” and that
nothing in the Constitution’s text forbids adherence to precedent. 102 On
a more conceptual level, the precedent fallback coheres with
consequentialism’s foundational premises. In the absence of any conflict
between precedent and original meaning,103 deference to precedent may
be justified as tending to produce greater benefits than alternative
approaches to the resolution of constitutional disputes. That is, the
precedent fallback is consistent with consequentialist originalism so
long as the functional benefits of stare decisis exceed the benefits of
alternative responses to the lack of textual and historical clarity. 104 For
those who see significant value in promoting judicial constraint and

should be followed. Second, we hold that passing a constitution through a strict supermajoritarian
process provides the best method for discovering and enacting a good constitution.”).
98. See id. at 189 (“[T]he strong reasons for following the original meaning generally
preclude a presumption in favor of precedent.”).
99. See id. at 181–82 (“[E]ntrenched precedent should take priority over the original
meaning. . . . It is the precedent rather than the original meaning that currently has consensus
support and thus a presumption of beneficence.”).
100. See id. at 179 (“Precedents should be respected when overruling them would result in
enormous costs.”).
101. Id. at 177.
102. Id. at 154–55.
103. Cf. id. at 185 (“When the original meaning is uncertain, a far stronger argument exists
for following precedent—provided that the precedent constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the
original meaning—than when the precedent clearly conflicts with the original meaning.”).
104. Cf. id. at 186 (“[C]onstitutional ambiguity militates against the original meaning because
we cannot be sure exactly what meaning obtained consensus support during the enactment
process.”).
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legal stability, there is a powerful argument that this condition holds
true.105
The precedent fallback’s consequentialist payoff arises from the
enhancement of predictability, continuity, and uniformity that a sound
doctrine of precedent can offer by supplementing textual ambiguity
with durable judicial interpretations.106 It also reflects the importance
of cultivating impersonal legal norms that resist alteration. Moreover,
when a precedent has engendered substantial reliance, the
consequentialist argument for stare decisis becomes even stronger:
preserving a precedent whose overruling would threaten significant
disruption—say, by undermining the lawfulness of paper money or
jettisoning the Social Security system—is a means of controlling
transition costs.107
The precedent fallback thus advances the consequentialist
project of promoting functional benefits without disturbing the baseline
assumption that respecting supermajoritarian judgments is usually the
wisest course. To be sure, a different assessment of the respective
importance of settlement, stability, and constraint could lead to a more
skeptical view of the precedent fallback. But if one is inclined to ascribe
significant value to such matters, consequentialist originalism permits
a fallback rule of deference to precedent.
C. Popular Sovereignty Originalism
A third justification for originalism is the principle of popular
sovereignty. The popular sovereignty account focuses on the nature of
a written constitution as “a people’s highest expression of its consent to
the government.”108 Constitutional discourse results in “binding
expressions of [the people’s] will” that become the “fundamental law”
for private citizens and public officials alike.109 For popular sovereignty
originalists, the distinctive nature of constitutional politics dictates

105. Cf. Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 49 (1989)
(“[A]dherence to rules even when the rules dictate incorrect results—as they inevitably will in
some cases—may achieve more value and thus be more ‘correct’ than deciding each individual case
‘correctly.’ ”).
106. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 185 (“[I]f the original meaning is unclear,
then there is less reason to follow it. Instead, a precedent that reasonably resolves the uncertainty
will better promote clarity, even though a court may later believe the precedent resolved the matter
incorrectly.”).
107. See id. at 186 (“[Reliance costs] will be high when the government establishes a program
that people rely on to a great extent, such as Social Security. And they will be great when people
make significant private investments based on assumptions about the law.”).
108. WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 128.
109. Id. at 135.
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that “the laws of the Constitution trump the laws of the mere
majority.”110 As compared with the operation of ordinary majoritarian
politics, the people are engaged in a more foundational enterprise when
they create and alter the Constitution.111 Within the realm of
conventional politics, “a variety of factors tend to undermine the link
between the will of political actors and the actual majoritarian will of
the people.”112 Constitutional debates alleviate these problems by
permitting “direct[ ] appeal[s] to” the people and “provid[ing] for the
highest degree of democratic input by the people directly.”113 It follows
that popular sovereignty demands respect for original meanings, which
have “earned the right to be treated as the will of the people.”114 This
conclusion is reinforced by originalism’s focus on ensuring that every
generation has the power to engage in its own “higher-order decision
making.”115
Viewed against the backdrop of popular sovereignty, conflicts
between original meaning and stare decisis require consideration of the
degree to which judicial precedent interferes with the political will. 116
When the judiciary fails to protect a constitutional liberty, the people
generally retain the power to insulate the neglected liberty through
legislation, thus mitigating the impact on popular sovereignty.117 That
creates the possibility that “a conscientious judge could uphold
erroneous precedent on stare decisis grounds without fatally
undermining the basic normative principle of democratic
government.”118 It may be permissible for a court to retain a dubious
precedent whose overruling would create significant disruption if the

110. Lash, supra note 1, at 1445.
111. It is sometimes suggested that the sovereignty of the people ebbs and flows, coming to
fruition only during the process of constitutional deliberation. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27,
at 143 (“By engaging in constitutional meaning, by entering into a discourse as to what the text
means and what kind of constitution should govern us, we are drawn into the sovereign.”).
112. Lash, supra note 1, at 1445.
113. Id. at 1445–46; see also id. at 1446 n.24 (“[I]t is the ultimately majoritarian basis of the
Constitution and its rules for amendment that establish the legitimacy of the document under the
theory of popular sovereignty.”).
114. Id. at 1444.
115. WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 111; see also id. at 133 (“By accepting the authority of
the Constitution, we accept our own authority to remake it. The existing Constitution is a
placeholder for our own future expression of popular sovereignty.”).
116. See Lash, supra note 1, at 1479 (“Under popular sovereignty, ‘judicial error’ is defined in
reference to the degree of departure from the considered will of the people.”).
117. But cf. Kurt T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of Normative
Theory, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2211 (2014) (“[I]t is possible that failure to intervene in
cases involving majoritarian interference with the political process would be viewed as imposing
just as high a cost as erroneous intervention in a matter of claimed immunity.”).
118. Id. at 2213.
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precedent’s error was the failure to fully protect a constitutional right—
a failure that could be rectified through ordinary legislation. By
contrast, judicial recognition of rights that do not find support in the
Constitution’s original meaning tends to be a more serious offense
against popular sovereignty; the only formal mechanism for political
correction is the process of constitutional amendment, which is onerous
and challenging.119 In situations of conflict, then, managing the tension
between stare decisis and originalism requires considering a
precedent’s degree of interference with the will of the people.
In the absence of such a conflict, precedent once again has
significant potential as a fallback rule. The popular sovereignty
approach reflects the belief that the enacted Constitution is the highest
expression of the democratic will.120 If a court defers to a precedent that
is inconsistent with the Constitution’s original meaning, there is a risk
that popular sovereignty is being undermined. But that concern does
not arise when a court chooses to follow precedent only after concluding
that the Constitution’s original meaning is uncertain. Deferring to
precedent in those cases does not displace the sovereign will of the
people with the prerogative of the judiciary. It simply provides a
fallback rule for channeling judicial discretion where constitutional
meanings are unclear.
This analysis, however, must go a step further. A focus on
popular sovereignty may suggest a problem with deferring to precedent
even when the inquiry into the Constitution’s original meaning does not
furnish a clear resolution to a legal dispute. The source of the problem
is the institution of judicial review.121 Popular sovereignty originalism
accepts the invalidation of democratically enacted legislation in order
to effectuate the people’s directives as reflected in the written
Constitution.122 The rationale is that the people have made the courts
the “designated enforcer” of the Constitution, which is the ultimate
embodiment of popular will.123 It is the people’s delegation that saves
the exercise of judicial review from creating a “counter-majoritarian
difficulty” by placing the courts in opposition to the forces of
119. See Lash, supra note 1, at 1442.
120. See, e.g., WHITTINGTON , supra note 27, at 46 (describing the argument that “the practice
of judicial review derives from the Court’s claim to be enforcing the supreme law of the sovereign
people, which in turn requires an originalist approach”).
121. See, e.g., DaimlerChrylser Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006) (“Chief Justice
Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, grounded the Federal Judiciary’s authority to exercise judicial
review and interpret the Constitution on the necessity to do so in the course of carrying out the
judicial function of deciding cases.” (citation omitted)).
122. AMAR, supra note 92, at 238 (“Marbury-style judicial review presupposes that judges are
enforcing the people’s document, not their own deviations.”).
123. WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 112.
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democracy.124 By striking down legislative and executive actions that
violate the Constitution, courts promote self-government even as they
confound the efforts of transient political majorities.125
But popular sovereignty originalism may also suggest that the
judiciary lacks authority to invalidate political action in the absence of
a discernible prohibition in the Constitution’s original meaning. 126
When they invoke precedent to rebuff the political branches, the
argument goes, courts act without democratic authorization to exercise
the power of judicial review.127 Fidelity to precedent ends up elevating
the judiciary above the people.128
Nevertheless, there remains room for a precedent fallback
within popular sovereignty originalism. To see how, consider a criticism
that is often leveled against originalism: the application of original
meanings is inconsistent with the sovereignty of today’s citizens.129 In
reality, the critics charge, originalism subjects living, breathing persons
to commitments made by generations long past.130 Among the potential
responses to this criticism is that the sovereignty of today’s citizens
stems not from their explicit assent to the Constitution but rather from
their unquestioned power to change it.131 The authority to alter the old,
dusty Constitution resides, now and forever, in the generation of the
moment.132 That authority justifies imposition of the Constitution’s
imperatives upon those who played no role in the document’s creation.
124. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16 (2d ed. 1986).
125. See Lash, supra note 117, at 2206–07 (“[P]opular sovereigntist constitutional
government . . . protects the will of the super-majority over the will of the mere majority (or mere
transient political majorities).” (emphasis added)); Lash, supra note 1, at 1446 (“Popular
sovereignty theory resolves the [countermajoritarian] difficulty by grounding judicial review in the
more deeply democratic law of the people.”).
126. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 54. But cf. Keith E. Whittington, Constructing a New
American Constitution, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 119, 129 (2010) (“So long as judges are acting as
faithful agents to provisionally maintain constitutional understandings widely shared by other
political actors, then their role in articulating constitutional constructions may not be
objectionable.”).
127. See Lash, supra note 1, at 1447 (“Prior decisions that erroneously identify the original
meaning of the Constitution lack the very characteristic that, under popular sovereignty, justifies
judicial review.”).
128. Cf. Michael Stokes Paulsen, How to Interpret the Constitution (and How Not to), 115
YALE L.J. 2037, 2057 (2006) (“[I]f the meaning of the Constitution’s language fails to provide . . . [a
sufficiently determinate legal] rule or standard . . . then a court has no basis for displacing the rule
supplied by some other relevant source of law . . . .”).
129. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 92, at 1401 (discussing the issue of “dead hand control” over
subsequent generations).
130. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 15, at 2036–37.
131. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 149 (“The founders’ constitution gains authority over
us by giving us the capacity to reject it.”).
132. See John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 737, 778 (arguing that the Constitution is “our law by virtue of the fact that the
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A similar argument can support the application of the precedent
fallback in situations of constitutional uncertainty. Judicial precedent,
like enacted constitutional text, is binding only to the extent that
today’s generation allows it to be so. To be sure, the judiciary exacts a
cost on popular sovereignty when it improperly recognizes
constitutional rights whose elimination would require a constitutional
amendment; the amendment process is too costly and cumbersome to
fully mitigate judicial errors. Still, just as the people hold the power to
amend problematic constitutional text, they possess the power to
overturn mistaken judicial interpretations using the very same
amendment process.
One might object that this argument proves too much by
rationalizing adherence to flawed precedents even when the
Constitution’s original meaning is painstakingly clear. So long as the
amendment power resides with the people, why should courts ever
reconsider the judicial decisions of the past, even when those decisions
conflict with the Constitution’s original meaning? But this challenge
overlooks a crucial distinction between constitutional clarity and
constitutional uncertainty. The people’s control over the Constitution
depends on judicial fidelity to enacted meaning. It does little good for
the polity to ratify a constitutional amendment overturning a judicial
decision if, going forward, the courts possess authority to distort the
amendment itself.133 There is no comparable problem when judges
respond to a lack of constitutional clarity by deferring to judicial
precedent. By acknowledging that deference to precedent is permissible
only within the range of constitutional uncertainty, the judiciary
concedes its subservience to the people. At the same time, the precedent
fallback guides judicial discretion when the will of the people cannot
confidently be discerned.
The counterargument is that maximizing respect for popular
sovereignty demands adherence to the Constitution’s original meaning
or, where the original meaning is uncertain, deference to the actions of
political government. That position leaves no room for the doctrine of
stare decisis when the result is to strike down legislative or executive
action. But while such arguments are certainly reasonable, not every
constitutional lawyer who comes to originalism through devotion to
popular sovereignty must seek to optimize that value at the expense of
all others. Instead, it is plausible to argue that, while respect for

Founding generation made the Constitution, and each generation can amend the Constitution,
under largely the same supermajority rules”).
133. See WHITTINGTON , supra note 27, at 156 (“The ideal of popular sovereignty would be
meaningless if others could set the actions of the sovereign aside.”).
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popular sovereignty is essential, it demands only that judges apply the
enacted Constitution where its original meaning is discernible, because
the contrary view would undermine the people’s power to control the
document that governs them. When original meaning is uncertain,
judges may defer to precedent in order to promote other values such as
doctrinal continuity and impersonal adjudication. Even if it leads to the
invalidation of political action, adherence to precedent is justified by its
effects on doctrinal continuity, legal stability, and the power of
constitutional law to transcend periodic “changes in the composition of
the court.”134
The point is not that devotion to popular sovereignty requires
acceptance of the precedent fallback. The claim is simply this: For those
who see greater value in fostering doctrinal consistency and systemic
stability than in validating legislative and executive actions that
conflict with existing case law, a fallback rule of deference to precedent
can form a legitimate component of popular sovereignty originalism.
D. Other Theories of Originalism
While versions of originalism grounded in the rule of law,
consequentialism, and popular sovereignty are of special interest due
to their prominence in the recent literature, the utility of the precedent
fallback extends to other versions of originalism as well. To take one
more example, consider the argument that originalism has a basis in
legal positivism, 135 meaning that the methodology’s legitimacy derives
from its social acceptance.136 To oversimplify (greatly), the positivist
claim is that the content of constitutional law is understood by the
relevant stakeholders as flowing from the Constitution’s original
meaning, including its provisions for changing the law as it initially
existed.
The operation and implications of such a view are complex, but
the takeaway for present purposes is more straightforward. If one is
persuaded by the positivist argument regarding the relevance of the
Constitution’s original meaning, there is a strong basis for
134. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 146 (1921). But cf. id. (“I
think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be
inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in
frank avowal and full abandonment.”).
135. I am grateful to Will Baude, who is in the process of developing a positivist account of
originalism, for suggesting the relevance of positivist theories to this Article’s analysis.
136. For a recent inquiry into originalism’s potential connection with positivism, see Stephen
E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2015),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2498838, archived at http://
perma.cc/SW9W-RQG4.
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acknowledging a role for judicial precedent. Attention to precedent is a
well-established and well-accepted part of America’s constitutional
consciousness.137 And as explained in greater detail below, there is
historical support for the liquidation of constitutional uncertainty
through judicial pronouncements.138 To the extent it is persuasive, then,
the positivist account of originalism would seem to leave ample room
for a precedent fallback.
The example of positivism underscores the point that the
precedent fallback is not tethered to any particular strand of
originalism. The fallback rule is compatible with multiple versions of
originalism as a mechanism for controlling adjudicative change while
preserving a primary commitment to the Constitution’s original
meaning. Even so, the precedent fallback is not suitable for all versions
of originalism. For example, I argued above that it is possible to believe
both that (a) respect for popular sovereignty requires the application of
the Constitution’s original meaning when that meaning can confidently
be discerned, and (b) judges may legitimately defer to precedent when
the Constitution’s original meaning is uncertain.139 Yet, as I suggested,
such an argument will be unsatisfying to those who believe that the
power of judicial review is authorized only when the Constitution’s
commands are clear. Nor will the precedent fallback find favor among
those who believe that maximizing popular sovereignty trumps
competing values such as doctrinal stability even when the people act
through ordinary legislation rather than constitutional amendment.
The precedent fallback is likewise at odds with the belief that
the Constitution’s text and structure foreclose the invocation of judicial
precedent to resolve constitutional uncertainties. Particularly notable
on this point is the work of Michael Stokes Paulsen. Professor Paulsen
contends that the Constitution contains both instructions for
interpreting the document’s textual meaning and principles for
deciding what happens “when that meaning runs out.”140 Specifically,
“the logic of the governmental structure created by the Constitution
indicates that the democratic, republican institutions vested with
legislative and executive power” are the bodies charged with operating
in the realm of textual uncertainty.141 Professor Paulsen concludes that
political actions “must stand” unless they are “contrary to a rule of law
137. See, e.g., STRAUSS, supra note 84, at 33–34 (emphasizing the centrality of precedent in
constitutional litigation and adjudication).
138. See infra Part V.
139. See supra Part IV.
140. Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text, the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, So Help Me
God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten Constitution, 81 U. CHI . L. REV. 1385, 1434 (2014).
141. Id. at 1435.
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supplied by exegesis of the text.”142 The effect of his argument is to
prohibit judges from falling back on precedent, at least when the result
would be to invalidate political action. Professor Paulsen’s account
helps to illustrate why it would be incorrect to characterize the
precedent fallback as suitable for every version of originalism. Yet for
those who come to originalism through other normative and
methodological commitments—such as the commitments discussed
earlier in this Part—the precedent fallback remains worthy of
consideration as a response to constitutional uncertainty.
V. THE MECHANICS OF FALLING BACK
Having examined the precedent fallback’s conceptual
underpinnings and its coherence with prominent originalist theories, I
turn to the issue of implementation.143
A. Deference as Absolute or Presumptive?
The threshold question of implementation is whether the
precedent fallback should be rebuttable or absolute. An absolute
presumption would foreclose any deviation from precedent in cases
where the Constitution’s original meaning is uncertain. A rebuttable
presumption would permit the overruling of precedent in light of some
set of countervailing considerations.
Both the absolute presumption and the rebuttable presumption
are tenable approaches to the treatment of precedent within the
framework of originalism. There is no inherent problem with concluding
that the precedent fallback should be unwavering. Nor is there any
inherent problem with adopting a fallback preference for precedent
while recognizing that the preference may yield to other

142. Id. at 1437.
143. The analysis set forth in this Part, like this Article more generally, is limited to the
domain of constitutional precedents. I make no claims about the suitability of the analysis for
common-law or statutory precedents. I thus leave open the possibility that judge-made rules of
procedure or evidence that do not have a direct constitutional grounding should be more open to
reconsideration than are constitutional rules. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233–34
(2009) (“[T]he Saucier rule [for qualified immunity cases] is judge made and implicates an
important matter involving internal Judicial Branch operations. Any change should come from
this Court, not Congress.”). Nor do I necessarily endorse the conventional wisdom that
constitutional rulings should receive weaker deference than other judicial decisions—a position
that I view as understating the value of constitutional settlement and the benefits of channeling
constitutional change through the Article V amendment process. See, e.g., Patterson v. McClean
Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (noting the elevated strength of deference to statutory
precedents).
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considerations.144 But despite the legitimacy of both approaches, the
choice between them is crucial. Every recognized basis for overruling a
precedent creates a risk of diminishing doctrinal stability and
predictability. Likewise, the level of constraint that judges face will
dissipate to the extent they are permitted to invoke a variety of flexible
considerations as justifications for departing from disfavored
precedents.
Under the strongest formulation of the precedent fallback, a
judicial decision would be reconsidered only if it clashed with the
Constitution’s discernible meaning. When the judiciary has responded
to constitutional uncertainty through the creation of precedent, nothing
short of eliminating that uncertainty would trigger a reversal of course.
Such an approach would bolster the disciplining effect of precedent and
enhance the continuity of the legal order. Notwithstanding these
benefits, however, irrebuttable deference to precedent would
compromise other values: if a troublesome precedent did not violate the
Constitution’s discernible meaning, the legal system would be burdened
by the precedent unless and until the Constitution was formally
amended.
Those who are uncomfortable with such a strong rule of
precedent might recognize additional grounds for overruling in the face
of constitutional uncertainty. For example, overrulings might be
permitted in cases involving factual mistakes or anachronisms.145 When
material facts have changed or been proven false, there is a powerful
argument for updating a precedent so it no longer rests on faulty
foundations.146 In addition, there is good reason to reconsider
precedents that have proven unworkable—another consideration that,
like a precedent’s factual mistakes, is relevant to the Supreme Court’s
existing stare decisis jurisprudence. Overrulings might also be
acceptable for precedents whose consequences are immoral or
destructive.147 Of course, treating precedents as defeasible based on
distaste for their results raises serious concerns in terms of the ability
of stare decisis to constrain judicial discretion; if precedents are
vulnerable whenever a judge deems them “bad,” the precedent fallback

144. Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Constraints, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1009 (2009)
(“[A] constraint need not be absolute in order to count as a constraint.”).
145. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (including
among the factors that are relevant to a precedent’s durability “whether facts have so changed, or
come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or
justification”).
146. Cf. Randy J. Kozel, The Rule of Law and the Perils of Precedent, 111 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 37, 40–41 (2013) (discussing the rule of law costs of abiding by mistaken precedents).
147. Cf. Solum, supra note 48, at 200 (discussing the status of “evil” precedents).
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loses its power to unify the voice of different judicial actors working
across time. It is nevertheless intelligible to assert that, within a
narrow band of cases, a precedent’s harmful results should trigger its
reconsideration notwithstanding the attendant reduction in judicial
constraint.
The more general point is that so long as the grounds for
overruling are predefined and adequately cabined, a fallback rule that
permits departures from precedent can promote stability,
impersonality, and constraint. Such benefits obviously will not be as
great as they would be with a rule of absolute deference. Still, whether
one adopts a stronger or weaker view of the strength of stare decisis,
the precedent fallback remains available as a means of channeling
judicial discretion when the Constitution’s original meaning is
uncertain.
B. Precedential Status as Immediate or Gradual?
Beyond the characterization of deference as defeasible or
absolute, another question of implementation is when a judicial ruling
should become “vested” in the sense of warranting stare decisis effect.
Does a single decision carry the power to settle an issue? Or must
constitutional law develop more gradually through judicial
reaffirmances—or at least repeated applications—over the course of
time?
Overruling a precedent that has been applied or reaffirmed on
numerous occasions creates a risk of disrupting settled expectations
and destabilizing the law, which may suggest that recent decisions
should be more amenable to reconsideration than are longstanding and
entrenched lines of cases.148 Yet even the overruling of a recent opinion
can challenge the impersonality of constitutional adjudication. Imagine
if a new Supreme Court appointment in the coming years led to the
abrupt overruling of a high-profile case, such as Citizens United v.
FEC.149 Or recall Justice Marshall’s dissent in Payne v. Tennessee, in
which he vehemently criticized the majority for overruling recent
precedents despite the fact that “[n]either the law nor the facts,” but
“[o]nly the personnel of this Court,” had changed.150 The possibility that
148. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 152 (2010) (“[T]he more
recently the earlier case was decided, the less forcefully the stare decisis anti-overruling principle
should be applied.”).
149. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Am. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (refusing to accept Citizens United in an opinion joined by three other
justices).
150. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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recent precedents could effectively be undermined by a change—even a
single change—in the composition of the Court tends to conflate the
meaning of constitutional law with matters of judicial identity. It also
reinforces both the perception and reality that constitutional change
occurs through the judicial appointment process rather than the Article
V amendment process. In designing the precedent fallback, the better
approach is to treat all precedents as entitled to deference when the
Constitution’s original meaning is uncertain. The fact that a judicial
opinion is of recent vintage does not diminish its claim to presumptive
respect.
C. Deference for Some or Deference for All?
Given its emphasis on stability and impersonality, the precedent
fallback does not discriminate based on the style of reasoning that a
judicial opinion embodies. In particular, it does not reserve its
presumption of deference for originalist precedents while treating
nonoriginalist precedents as unworthy of fidelity. Instead, all
precedents can warrant deference, as long as they do not violate
whatever indicia of constitutional meaning are discernible. Prior
judicial responses to constitutional uncertainty are entitled to respect
even if their mode of reasoning is nonoriginalist.151
Prominent commentators have rejected the argument that
nonoriginalist precedents deserve the same deference as precedents
decided on originalist grounds. Robert Bork contended that “precedents
that reflect a good-faith attempt to discern the original understanding
deserve far more respect than those that do not.”152 In addition,
Lawrence Solum has urged greater deference for certain types of
precedents under his “neoformalist” approach to stare decisis. Professor
Solum recognizes value in judicial opinions whose mode of reasoning is
grounded in formalist considerations such as “constitutional text or
precedent.”153 His model accords less deference to judicial opinions that
employ “instrumentalist” considerations such as “moral goodness or
consequences.”154 Professor Solum’s explanation for this divergent
treatment is that instrumentalist reasoning, which depends heavily on
151. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 27, at 172 (“A constitutional theory respecting the role of
both interpretation and construction in fact assumes the existence of practices that cannot be
justified in originalist terms, for constructions necessarily operate where interpretations cannot
go.”).
152. BORK, supra note 6, at 157–58.
153. Solum, supra note 48, at 204.
154. Id.; see also id. at 203–04 (“If a decision rests on instrumentalist grounds, then the prima
facie case for regarding the decision as binding is rebutted.”).
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“the private judgments of adjudicators,” hinders the function of law in
“provid[ing] public standards for the resolution of disputes.” 155
Instrumentalist judging also makes it more difficult to forge “a
relatively high degree of consensus about what [a legal] code means and
how it applies.”156 The implication, Professor Solum concludes, is that
instrumentalist decisions should be more susceptible to overruling than
are originalist ones.157
Notwithstanding forceful arguments like those of Judge Bork
and Professor Solum, nonoriginalist precedents can settle areas of
textual and historical uncertainty by articulating constitutional rules
of decision. Moreover, nonoriginalist precedents, no less than originalist
ones, can constrain future judges. When nonoriginalist reasoning
furnishes the infrastructure of a judicial opinion, it becomes a publicly
available source of law that can engender reliance and limit judicial
discretion regardless of the normative sympathies that future judges
might harbor. This is not to say that every statement and prescription
contained within a nonoriginalist opinion (or, for that matter, an
originalist one) warrants deference going forward; as I will discuss
below, defining a precedent’s scope of constraint is a separate
concern.158 But on the more basic question of whether a judicial opinion
warrants any deference at all, the precedent fallback draws no
distinctions based on the style of reasoning that the opinion reflects. 159
If a court concludes that the Constitution’s original meaning is too
uncertain to resolve a dispute, the court should treat precedent as
entitled to presumptive respect regardless of its mode of reasoning.
VI. PRECEDENT AS A PRINCIPLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION
Thus far I have contended that the precedent fallback is
consistent with prominent versions of originalism. I have also claimed
that the fallback rule can enhance originalism’s ability to constrain
judges and promote legal continuity. This Part extends the analysis to
155. Id. at 181–82.
156. Id. at 182.
157. See id. at 194 (“Prior decisions which rest on formalist grounds could be given full binding
force, whereas precedents that rest on instrumentalist grounds could be treated as entitled only to
presumptive validity.”); id. at 201 (“[T]he neoformalist conception does not require that unlawful
decisions be regarded as binding; one reason a decision may be regarded as unlawful for this
purpose is that the decision rests on instrumentalist rather than formalist grounds.”).
158. See infra Part VII.B.
159. In this respect, the precedent fallback also differs from the theory of precedent advanced
by Lee Strang, who argues that “courts should overrule nonoriginalist constitutional precedent
except when overruling the precedent would gravely harm society’s pursuit of the common good.”
Strang, supra note 3, at 420 (footnote omitted).

138

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:1:105

the process of constitutional construction, which has received
considerable attention in constitutional scholarship of late.160 The
interpretation-construction distinction raises unique concerns about
originalism’s constraining force.161 I suggest that the precedent fallback
is a promising tool for alleviating those concerns.
A. Distinguishing Interpretation from Construction
Several scholars have pressed the argument that constitutional
adjudication is most profitably viewed as consisting of two steps:
interpretation and construction. Interpretation refers to the
discernment of the Constitution’s linguistic meaning. Construction
refers to the “translat[ion]” of linguistic meaning into rules, principles,
and decisions.162
The practice of interpretation, revolving as it does around
semantic meaning, depends on “linguistic facts . . . about patterns of
usage.”163 The objective is to uncover the Constitution’s “communicative
content,” which includes “the words and phrases as combined by the
rules of syntax and grammar” and “additional content provided by the
available context of legal utterance.”164 Yet communicative content
alone cannot resolve a constitutional dispute.
That is where construction comes in. Technically speaking, even
when the Constitution’s linguistic meaning is clear, the decision to
implement that meaning reflects a principle of construction (assuming
that one accepts the interpretation-construction divide). 165 A judge
conceivably could choose to ignore unmistakable constitutional text
based on considerations such as justice or policy. But adherence to
originalism negates that possibility.166 For originalists, the role of

160. See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 126, at 119.
161. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 17, at 502–03.
162. Solum, supra note 16, at 103 (“Courts engage in judicial construction when they translate
the linguistic meaning of a legal text into doctrine.”).
163. Id. at 104.
164. Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
479, 488 (2013).
165. See Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65,
67 (2011) (“Where the semantic meaning of the text provides enough information to resolve a
particular issue about constitutionality, applying it will require little, if any, supplementation, and
construction will look indistinguishable in practice from interpretation.”); Solum, supra note 17,
at 499 (“In some cases, judges may attend only to interpretation (because construction seems
obvious and intuitive). In other cases, judges may focus entirely on construction . . . But in either
case, construction occurs.”).
166. Cf. Solum, supra note 164, at 482 (“[O]riginalists characteristically endorse . . . the
constraint
principle—which
requires
that
the
communicative
content
of
the

2015]

PRECEDENT FALLBACK

139

construction moves to the forefront only “when the traditional tools of
interpretation exhaust themselves.”167 The question then becomes how
to “determine legal effect when the meaning of the text runs out.”168
Linguistic indeterminacy may arise in several ways. The
historical record may have become too fragmented or opaque to furnish
a reliable answer to a particular problem, leading to what Professor
Solum has called “epistemic ambiguity.”169 Alternatively, a term may
be so “general, abstract, and vague” as to defy resolution based on
linguistic meaning alone.170 One possible example of this phenomenon
is the Fourth Amendment’s use of the phrase “unreasonable searches
and seizures,” in which “[t]he term ‘unreasonable’ communicates no
bright lines to distinguish whether a particular mode of searching is
permissible or impermissible.”171 Another is the scope of the “judicial
Power of the United States” as articulated in Article III. That power
pretty clearly includes some things, such as conducting a “trial of an
action of trespass on the case,”172 and excludes others, such as enacting
a criminal statute. But there may be “borderline” cases, like “conducting
an administrative hearing in a dispute between the government and a
contractor over payments,” in which the constitutional text and
historical context fall short of furnishing a clear answer.173
Linguistic indeterminacy may also arise from “gaps” in the
constitutional framework that leave courts and other public officials
without “clear instruction for resolving important constitutional
issues.”174 Like constitutional ambiguities, gaps may reflect either a
“genuine oversight by constitutional drafters or . . . delegation to future
political decision-makers.”175 Whatever their genesis, gaps open the
door for constitutional construction. If, for example, the enacted
Constitution contains a gap regarding how executive branch officials

Constitution . . . should constrain the content of constitutional doctrine, unless a defeasibility
condition obtains.”).
167. Whittington, supra note 126, at 121.
168. Solum, supra note 17, at 516 (“[D]efault rules are paradigm cases of rules of construction.
The whole idea of a default rule is to determine legal effect when the meaning of the text runs
out.”).
169. Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. C ONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
409, 440 (2009).
170. Solum, supra note 17, at 458 (arguing that “the actual text of the U.S. Constitution
contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require constitutional construction for their
application to concrete constitutional cases”).
171. Barnett, supra note 40, at 635.
172. Solum, supra note 17, at 501.
173. Id.
174. Whittington, supra note 126, at 123.
175. Id.
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“are to be removed from office,”176 the result is an indeterminacy that
can be resolved through construction.
In each of these categories of constitutional indeterminacy,
whatever indicia of linguistic meaning are discernible must be
respected, so the zone of judicial discretion—that is, “the construction
zone”177—will always be bounded.178 Within that zone, however, factors
beyond linguistic meaning will carry the analytical burden. 179
B. Perspectives on Constitutional Construction
Any theory of originalism that emphasizes the interpretationconstruction distinction must furnish one or more principles of
construction for responding to linguistic indeterminacy. The content of
those principles will reflect underlying beliefs about the nature and
ends of constitutional adjudication.180 In Section C, I will recharacterize
the precedent fallback as a principle of construction that requires
presumptive fidelity to precedent based on a paramount commitment
to the stability and impersonality of law. Before doing so, it will be
useful to compare—in brief and, thus, oversimplified fashion—several
approaches to construction that are prominent in the literature.
One proponent of the distinction between interpretation and
construction is Randy Barnett, who argues that the judicial response to
constitutional indeterminacy should be shaped by the recognition that
“lawmakers acting pursuant to their constitutional powers govern those
who did not consent.”181 In order to safeguard the rights of the governed,
the Constitution’s “vague terms should be given the meaning that is
most respectful of the rights of all who are affected.”182 This view leads
Professor Barnett to endorse a “presumption of liberty,” whereby
constitutional indeterminacy is resolved against governmental
176. Id. at 123–24.
177. Solum, supra note 16, at 108.
178. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY . L. REV. 611, 647
(1999) (“[W]hen the original public meaning of a term or provision in a written constitution fails
to provide a unique rule of law to apply to a particular case, it still provides a ‘frame’ that, while
excluding many possibilities, requires choice among the set of unexcluded alternatives.”).
179. Barnett, supra note 165, at 69 (arguing that rules of construction “are rules that apply
when the information conveyed by the text itself is insufficient to decide an issue, but the issue
still must somehow be decided”).
180. Cf. Barnett, supra note 40, at 636–37 (“[O]ne’s theory of construction inescapably
depends on one’s theory of constitutional legitimacy.”); Whittington, supra note 126, at 121 (noting
that “constitutional constructions make normative appeals about what the Constitution should be,
melding what is known about the Constitution with what is desired”).
181. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
125 (2004).
182. Id. at 126.
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“infringement on individual freedom.”183 Professor Barnett defends the
presumption of liberty based in part on its effectiveness at
“implementing the original meaning of the text” as understood in light
of provisions such as the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.184
Professor Barnett also advocates a more general preference for
“constructions that enhance the legitimacy of the Constitution,” with a
focus on the “qualities that enable a legal system to issue laws that bind
in conscience those upon whom they are imposed.”185 Among the
relevant considerations are whether “laws are ‘proper,’ in that the laws
do not violate [people’s] rights,” and whether laws “are ‘necessary’ to
protect the rights of others.”186 Finally, if “competing constructions are
both equally consistent with original meaning and not clearly
preferable on grounds of legitimacy,” it may be appropriate to retain
prior judicial constructions “subject to the doctrine of precedent.”187
In contrast to Professor Barnett, Jack Balkin envisions
constitutional construction as the process by which “each generation”
decides “how to make sense of the Constitution’s words and principles”
by “applying them to our own time and our own situation.”188 The role
of the courts is “usually more cooperative than competitive” with the
actions of political government.189 The judiciary “rationalizes and
supplements constitutional constructions by the political branches[ ]
and responds to changes in political and cultural values in the nation
as a whole.”190 Judicial doctrine becomes a means of both “legitimation”
and “policing.”191 It enables courts to “provid[e] reasons why the
constructions” of the political branches “are faithful to the
Constitution.”192 At the same time, the creation of doctrine allows courts
to “set boundaries on what the political branches can do”193 and to
“impose the values of national majorities on regional or local
183. Id. at 259–60.
184. See Barnett, supra note 79, at 265 & n.22.
185. See id. at 265.
186. Barnett, supra note 40, at 643.
187. Barnett, supra note 79, at 265.
188. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 293, 352
(2007); see also Dorf, supra note 15, at 2012 (characterizing Professor Balkin’s argument as
indicating that “the Constitution’s legitimacy derives from a historical process of continual popular
commitment to see in the Constitution the possibility of redeeming the document’s own promises
of a more just society”).
189. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 300 (2011).
190. Id.; see also Adam M. Samaha, Talk About Talking About Constitutional Law, 2012 U.
ILL. L. REV. 783, 788 (noting Professor Balkin’s emphasis on “today’s conventional modes of
constitutional argument and the results reached thereunder”).
191. BALKIN, supra note 189, at 300.
192. Id. at 300–01.
193. Id. at 301.
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majorities.”194 Through this combination of legitimation and policing,
courts safeguard the people’s authority to “fill out” the constitutional
framework “over time.”195 That process can entail the overruling of
judicial precedents, which should not persist after their principles have
been rendered “obsolete” by “changes in demographics, economics,
technology, social customs, or other features of social life.”196
A third approach to construction comes from Keith Whittington.
Professor Whittington underscores the importance of deferring to the
political branches in cases of constitutional indeterminacy. 197 While
judicial review of political action is appropriate when the courts are
enforcing determinate meanings that are closely linked to
constitutional text, “[i]t is . . . a harder case to make out that courts
should have the authority to trump the actions of elected officials
merely on the basis of constitutional constructions.”198 Even so,
Professor Whittington suggests that judicial doctrines may reflect
acceptable “efforts at filling in the constitutional framework.”199
Deference to the political branches is a vital part of constitutional
construction, but there is room for courts to venture beyond the
determinate meaning of constitutional text in order to “provisionally
maintain constitutional understandings widely shared by other
political actors.”200
Taken in combination, these examples provide a sense of how
principles of construction are developed and defended. They also
highlight the connection between the process of constitutional
construction and underlying theories of constitutional legitimacy. The
194. Id. at 302.
195. Compare id. at 3 (describing a theory of “framework originalism” that “views the
Constitution as an initial framework for governance that sets politics in motion, and that
Americans must fill out over time through constitutional construction”), with id. at 54 (“In
framework originalism . . . popular sovereignty is not only central to the creation of the written
framework, it also underwrites the constructions built on top of the framework that flesh it out
over time.”).
196. Id. at 124; see also id. (“When previous constructions no longer make sense or have
become deeply unjust or unworkable, it is time to adjust them or substitute new ones.”).
197. See WHITTINGTON , supra note 27, at 172 (“[A]n originalist judiciary . . . would not strike
down every government action that cannot be justified in originalist terms but only those that are
inconsistent with known constitutional requirements.”).
198. Whittington, supra note 126, at 127.
199. Id. at 128.
200. Id. at 129. This is not the only reason why one might endorse judicial restraint in the
face of constitutional uncertainty. For example, Adrian Vermeule has defended a restrained
approach for reasons including the relative competencies of courts and legislatures. See ADRIAN
VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 230 (2006) (“Judges should . . . defer to legislatures on
the interpretation of constitutional texts that are ambiguous, can be read at multiple levels of
generality, or embody aspirational norms whose content changes over time with shifting public
values.”).
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optimal process of construction will vary depending on whether one’s
normative touchstone is individual liberty, collective self-government,
or otherwise. Further, even theories that are not explicitly couched in
the language of constitutional construction can be translated into
compatible terms. A salient example is Gary Lawson’s suggestion that
linguistic indeterminacy should be resolved “against the existence of
federal power and in favor of the existence of state power.”201 Such a
claim can be reframed as a principle of construction to guide the
resolution of disputes when the Constitution’s original meaning is
indeterminate.202 The broader point is that the available approaches to
construction are not limited to those that expressly endorse the
interpretation-construction divide.
Selecting a principle of constitutional construction is not the
only issue that divides construction-minded originalists. There are also
differences of opinion over what portion of the constitutional landscape
is settled by linguistic meaning. For example, Professor Balkin
contends that although the Constitution’s “basic framework” must be
respected, it “does not settle most disputed questions of constitutional
interpretation.”203 Other scholars will be more inclined to find
constitutional determinacy based on their interpretation of the relevant
linguistic facts. But regardless of how one defines the area in which
construction is required, within that zone there must be an appeal to
an organizing normative theory and a corresponding set of adjudicative
tools.204
C. The Precedent Fallback as a Principle of Construction
We have seen that judges can respond to linguistic
indeterminacy in myriad ways. They can defer to the political branches,
pursue the coherence of constitutional law with contemporary moral
sensibilities, or protect individual liberty against governmental

201. Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1225, 1234 (2012); see also id. at
1234–35 (“If it is uncertain whether the Constitution forbids a state from acting, the state (or
whoever claims under the relevant state act) wins.”).
202. See Solum, supra note 17, at 513 (“Lawson’s default rules are best viewed as rules of
construction.”); see also Lawson, supra note 201, at 1235 (“One could, of course, call [the proposed]
allocation of burdens of proof a kind of constitutional construction [but] . . . [t]he proposition that
he who asserts must prove is a basic principle of rational thinking, not a normative theory of
governance.”).
203. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641,
649 (2013).
204. See id. at 718 (“Lawyers engaged in constitutional construction are building out the
Constitution-in-practice. In so doing, they can and should use all of the available tools of argument
and persuasion.”).
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encroachment.205 Given the normative overlap of originalism and stare
decisis,206 it is also worth considering another approach to
constitutional construction: judges faced with linguistic indeterminacy
can fall back on precedent.207
The precedent fallback is grounded in the pursuit of judicial
constraint and legal continuity. Deference to precedent can limit
judicial discretion, reduce the role of subjective judgment, and bolster
the idea that constitutional law has an independent essence apart from
the periodic comings and goings on the judicial bench.208 I explained in
Part III how these objectives support a fallback rule of deference to
precedent as an intrinsic component of originalist theory. Refashioned
as a tool of constitutional construction, the precedent fallback advances
the same goals through a different analytical framework.
As an approach to constitutional construction, the precedent
fallback entails that when the Constitution’s linguistic meaning is
indeterminate, courts should act in a manner that is heavily
constrained by external sources and that enhances systemic stability,
resists disruption, and draws together individual judges as part of a
cohesive whole. The precedent fallback implies that courts should
pursue these goals even at the expense of other objectives such as
maximizing individual liberty or deferring to political government.
When a judge has doubts about the Constitution’s original meaning as
applied to a given dispute, she should defer to existing case law—
thereby redirecting the forces of legal change toward other channels. 209
This is true regardless of whether the relevant precedents are
originalist or nonoriginalist in their reasoning.210 What matters is a

205. For discussion of another potential approach to constitutional construction, see Solum,
supra note 17, at 473 (“The Moral Readings Theory contends that the resolution of constitutional
issues in the construction zone should be guided directly by considerations of political morality.”).
206. See supra Part II.A.
207. Cf. Barnett, supra note 79, at 265 (“[J]udicial constructions of the Constitution that are
not inconsistent with original meaning may well be subject to the doctrine of precedent.”); Solum,
supra note 16, at 105 n.21 (“[O]ne might argue that constructions must be consistent with the
purposes, functions, or goals that motivated adoption of the text, and that judicial construction
should be bound by the doctrine of stare decisis.”); Strang, supra note 76, at 1784 (“[O]riginalist
precedent in the context of construction resolves original indeterminacy.”).
208. See Dorf, supra note 60, at 683 (“While stare decisis does not preclude the occasional
overruling of cases, the fact that a court’s personnel have changed and the new judges have a
different view of the law from that of their predecessors is not, by itself, a sufficient basis for
overruling.”); supra Part II.A.
209. Cf. Merrill, supra note 51, at 981 (“If the Court were to commit to a strong theory of
precedent in constitutional law, it would reduce the prospects for change through constitutional
interpretation.”).
210. See supra Part V.C.
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precedent’s status as a component of the preexisting legal order that
can guide judicial discretion and promote impersonality and continuity.
Setting forth an exhaustive normative justification for any
theory of constitutional construction is a complicated enterprise, and I
do not purport to do so in this space. My aim for present purposes is
merely to sketch the basic outline of such a justification by
incorporating the earlier discussion of the conceptual overlap between
precedent and originalism.211 Efforts to ground the originalist
methodology in considerations of judicial constraint, stability, and
impersonality can extend in large measure to the precedent fallback’s
merits as a principle of constitutional construction. 212 Like the
Constitution’s original meaning, precedent has the power to constrain
the judicial will. 213 Like original meaning, precedent can infuse the
legal system with a sense of stability and predictability, making legal
change the province of the people—via the formal amendment process—
rather than the judiciary.214 And like original meaning, precedent can
encourage a judge to subordinate her own preferences to overarching
legal norms.215 Stare decisis facilitates the act of deferring to one’s
predecessors on grounds that the court as an institution is something
more than the court as an accumulation of individuals. 216 Such
deference is powerful proof that it is the rule of law, not the rule of men
and women, that defines the liberties and obligations of persons. Of
course, deference to precedent may not always carry the day; there are
plausible reasons to conclude that the value of continuity will
sometimes be overcome by the drawbacks of entrenching mistakes. 217
But a general presumption—even a rebuttable one—of deference to
precedent can promote judicial impersonality where the Constitution’s
original meaning is uncertain.218
D. Beyond Constitutional Construction
In defending the precedent fallback and recasting it as a
principle of constitutional construction, I have addressed cases that
satisfy two criteria: first, there is no clear conflict between precedent
and the Constitution’s original meaning; and second, there are relevant
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part V.A.
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precedents on the books. What if those assumptions are relaxed? Does
endorsement of the precedent fallback as a principle of construction
imply anything about situations where precedent conflicts with the
Constitution’s original meaning, or about the resolution of
constitutional indeterminacy in cases of first impression?
The answer to the former question, dealing with situations of
conflict, was suggested above in Part III. In short, adopting a precedent
fallback in cases of constitutional uncertainty does not have any
necessary implications for cases in which the Constitution’s original
meaning is clear. One might support a rigid approach that always, or
nearly always, requires applying the Constitution’s clear meaning
regardless of whether it conflicts with precedent. Alternatively, one
might recognize various grounds for deferring to precedent even when
the Constitution’s original meaning is clear.219 Either approach is
consistent with deference to precedent in instances of constitutional
uncertainty.
As for cases of first impression: It is one thing to say that, for
example, the “actual malice” rule of New York Times v. Sullivan220
deserves deference as a valid construction made in response to
constitutional indeterminacy.221 It is quite another thing to figure out
how courts should respond to indeterminacy in the absence of binding
precedent. For present purposes, the important point is that the
precedent fallback does not require any particular approach to cases of
first impression. It is true that, in order to maintain theoretical
coherence with the precedent fallback, one’s treatment of cases of first
impression should evince a comparable focus on promoting constraint,
stability, and impersonality. Still, there are multiple approaches that
could satisfy this requirement. A theory that requires deference to
political action may constrain the judicial will.222 But an alternative
approach that emphasizes the protection of individual liberty could also
constrain judges if its directives were publicly accessible and
articulated with precision. The precedent fallback is compatible with
both of these—and other—options in cases of first impression. All that
219. See supra Part IV.B.
220. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964):
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public
official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official
conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with “actual malice”—that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
221. Cf. Solum, supra note 164, at 516 (“[T]he rule of New York Times v. Sullivan is part of
the legal content of constitutional doctrine, but it is not part of the communicative content of the
text of the First Amendment.”).
222. See supra Part II.A.
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is required is that one’s theory of construction in the absence of relevant
precedent meshes with an overarching commitment to a stable and
impersonal rule of law.
E. Acknowledging the Case Against Construction
The division of constitutional adjudication into discrete steps of
interpretation and construction is a controversial proposition. Some
commentators criticize the interpretation-construction distinction as
insufficiently attentive to Founding Era understandings regarding the
proper response to linguistic indeterminacy. They contend that judges
must respect not only original understandings about the meaning of
constitutional text but also original understandings about how judges
should proceed when linguistic meaning is uncertain.223 The resulting
theory is one of “original methods originalism.”224
The core of this argument is that the Constitution’s original
meaning encompasses its original “interpretive rules.”225 If it was
understood at the time of ratification that judges would resolve
apparent ambiguities by selecting whichever meaning “was supported
by the stronger evidence,” the need for judicial construction would be
diminished.226 The province of construction would be limited even
further if there was a Founding Era understanding that linguistic
uncertainty should be resolved by upholding the validity of political
action through “defer[ence] to the legislature’s interpretation.”227 The
basic idea is that the Constitution comes packaged with its own
troubleshooting manual, so judges should resist the urge to engage the
machinery of constitutional construction at the first sign of complexity.
A related claim is that the move to construction often occurs without
proper appreciation of the fact that what appears to be “abstract
meaning” will “turn out to have either a concrete or a general meaning
that is not abstract.”228
In response, some proponents of the interpretation-construction
distinction argue that the Constitution’s original meaning does not
include interpretive assumptions that lack textual footing. According to

223. See MCGINNIS & RAPPAPORT, supra note 1, at 141 (“[T]he constructionist claim that
ambiguity and vagueness necessarily cause the original meaning to run out is untrue. There can
be background interpretive rules that provide sufficient resources for resolving ambiguity and
vagueness.”).
224. Id. at 116.
225. Id. at 128–29.
226. Id. at 143.
227. Id.
228. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 739.
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Professor Barnett, “[w]hen a supermajority ‘approves’ a constitution,
they are not adopting as law their own private intentions or
assumptions, or those of others. Rather, they are adopting a text that
has an objective public meaning.”229 Construction-minded originalists
also contend that many interpretive assumptions are best understood
as “canons of construction” that “determine legal effect and not
linguistic meaning.”230
With respect to the precedent fallback, the stakes of this debate
relate not to the fallback’s validity but to the number of cases in which
it will apply. For those who defend the interpretation-construction
distinction and assert that the Constitution’s linguistic meaning is
separable from extratextual assumptions about how linguistic
indeterminacy should be resolved, the precedent fallback will have a
relatively wide domain. For those who emphasize the relevance of
original interpretive rules for resolving linguistic indeterminacy, the
construction zone will be smaller. 231
But the difference between the two approaches takes on a
different complexion against the backdrop of history. There is reason to
believe that deference to precedent was itself a recognized interpretive
method from the time of the Founding.232 James Madison wrote that
the meaning of the law can be “liquidated and ascertained by a series
of particular discussions and adjudications.”233 Caleb Nelson has
characterized Madison’s writings and other contemporaneous sources
as evincing an understanding that “[o]nce the meaning of an ambiguous
provision had been ‘liquidate[d]’ by a sufficiently deliberate course of
legislative or judicial decisions, future actors were generally bound to
accept the settled interpretation even if they would have chosen a

229. Barnett, supra note 40, at 659; see also Barnett, supra note 165, at 69 (“Originalism is
not a theory of what to do when original meaning runs out.”).
230. Solum, supra note 17, at 510.
231. See McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 742 (“It is possible that a constitutional
provision that contains abstract language is best understood as having an abstract meaning that
allows future decision makers significant power to define its meaning.”).
232. I am assuming, arguendo, that the original meaning of the Constitution’s text does not
provide a clear account of the proper role of precedent. If that assumption is incorrect, deference
to precedent might be better characterized as grounded in constitutional text rather than original
interpretive methods. Cf. Strang, supra note 3, at 452 (“By the time of the Ratification, the
Framers and Ratifiers understood judicial power to include stare decisis: judges must give
significant respect to prior analogous cases and must give significant reasons for overruling
precedents.”).
233. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison); see also Nelson, supra note 48, at 13
(“Madison’s idea of ‘liquidation’ is . . . [that] [t]he interpreter gets to pick a particular interpretation
from within a range of possibilities, but the interpreter is not at liberty to go beyond that range.”).
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different one as an original matter.”234 According to Professor Nelson,
that obligation was relaxed when “a prior construction went beyond the
range of indeterminacy.”235 Precedent thus became a tool for limiting
“the discretion that legal indeterminacy would otherwise give
judges.”236 The result was to “ ‘fix’ the meaning of provisions that were
indeterminate when they emerged from the Philadelphia
Convention.”237 Critics of the interpretation-construction distinction
have likewise acknowledged that around the time of the Founding, “it
was sometimes claimed that unclear provisions would be liquidated or
clarified over time through a series of reasonable judicial
interpretations”238—a practice resembling the precedent fallback. 239
Understood in this way, the precedent fallback is not only a theory of
constitutional construction with a basis in normative reasoning but also
an original interpretive method with a basis in historical practice. 240
Yet there is an additional layer of complexity regarding the role
of precedent in liquidating constitutional meaning. On one hand, it may
be that the Constitution itself “instruct[s] future interpreters to honor
settled liquidations of its indeterminacies” because the document was
understood “not only to define a range of permissible interpretations,
but also to delegate power to the provision’s initial interpreters to make
234. Nelson, supra note 48, at 12; see also William Baude, Rethinking the Federal Eminent
Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1811 (2013) (“[P]ost-ratification practice can serve to give
concrete meaning to a constitutional provision even if it was vague as an original matter.”);
Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist
Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 665–66 (1999) (“[I]n Madison’s view, a precedent that is thought to
expound or interpret the law or the Constitution is worthy of deference, but once the precedent
ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected.”); H. Jefferson
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 941 (1985) (“[F]or
Madison there could be no return to the unadorned text from interpretations that had received the
approbation of the people.”).
235. Nelson, supra note 48, at 14; see also id. at 11 (“Written laws, then, would have a range
of indeterminacy. Madison and his contemporaries believed that precedents would operate within
this range.”).
236. Id. at 8.
237. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 583.
238. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 760; see also id. (“This would fix the meaning
and obligate future courts to follow the meaning.”).
239. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 550 n.136 (discussing the interpretation-construction
distinction and asserting that “[f]or members of the founding generation . . . settled ‘liquidations’
of the Constitution’s meaning . . . helped to define the law that courts and other actors were obliged
to follow”); Nelson, supra note 48, at 83–84 (arguing that, with respect to judicial choices among
plausible interpretations, “it is perfectly sensible for courts to apply a rebuttable presumption
against overruling precedents”).
240. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 549–50; cf. Barnett, supra note 79, at 269 (“When we cannot
tell whether a term meant X or Y when it was enacted, early practice favoring X over Y might be
an interpretive convention that clarifies original meaning in a manner that is compatible with the
normative case for originalism.”).
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an authoritative selection within that range.”241 On the other hand,
perhaps the Founding generation viewed constitutional liquidation as
a facet of “so-called ‘general’ law” that was consistent with
contemporary “custom and reason” but nonbinding on future
generations.242 That latter view would mean that “present-day
originalists are free to consider alternative approaches to the
Constitution’s indeterminacies.”243 (It is also possible that there is no
historical evidence sufficient to establish which of these two positions
predominated.244)
Notwithstanding this uncertainty, there is a basis for concluding
that, at very least, reliance on precedent was a permissible response to
linguistic indeterminacy at the time of the Founding.245 To be sure,
some originalists contend that the response to indeterminacy must be
based on Founding Era understandings rather than normative
assessments. Thus, if it was understood that all cases of indeterminacy,
or even a subset of those cases, would be resolved through application
of an interpretive principle other than deference to precedent, that
principle would have a superior claim to validity as an original
interpretive method. But if deference to precedent was one of several
legitimate tools for dealing with linguistic indeterminacy, the precedent
fallback has an adequate historical footing. The fallback may not be
required by history,246 but neither is it foreclosed.
A focus on historical understandings may also have implications
for the precedent fallback’s operational details. For example,
characterizations of liquidation as occurring over a series of actions may
suggest that judicial propositions warrant deference only after they
have been applied and affirmed in multiple opinions. 247 Such an
understanding would affect the determination of when a precedent
241. Nelson, supra note 5, at 551.
242. Id. at 552; see also id. at 553 (suggesting that the view of liquidation as general law is
“more plausible than the notion that members of the founding generation understood the
Constitution itself to require adherence to settled liquidations”).
243. Id. at 552–53.
244. See id. at 553.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 232–40; cf. Harrison, supra note 61, at 522 (arguing
that “Americans at the time of the Framing expected courts generally to follow precedent,” but
denying “that during the Framing era the idea of judicial power was thought logically to imply the
creation of precedent”).
246. Cf. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 132, at 759–60 (citing evidence of “at least three
approaches to resolving” constitutional uncertainty: “pick the interpretation that appears to be the
most likely,” uphold legislation “if a reasonable interpretation of the [applicable constitutional]
provision would allow the legislation,” and permit the Constitution to be “liquidated or clarified
over time through a series of reasonable judicial interpretations”).
247. Cf. Nelson, supra note 48, at 36 (“The reason people trusted a series of decisions more
than an individual judge’s opinion was that the series reflected a collective judgment.”).

2015]

PRECEDENT FALLBACK

151

becomes binding for purposes of applying the precedent fallback. I
contended above that the best approach is to treat individual opinions
as entitled to deference, so as to minimize the risk of abrupt reversals
that are closely associated with changes in judicial personnel. 248 If,
however, deference to a single precedent was not an original
interpretive method of dealing with constitutional indeterminacy, this
normative analysis would give way (for proponents of the original
methods approach) to historical practice, and deference would flow only
after an opinion was reaffirmed and converted into a line of
jurisprudence over the course of time.
It is also important to note Professor Nelson’s argument that
liquidation could occur through the decisions of the political branches
as well as the judiciary.249 To similar effect is the Supreme Court’s
recent discussion of the recess appointments power, in which a majority
of Justices made clear that “the longstanding ‘practice of the
government’ can inform our determination of ‘what the law is.’ ”250 The
phenomenon of constitutional liquidation through political practice
raises two issues. The first is what value courts should give to political
constructions in the absence of contrary judicial precedent. Adoption of
the precedent fallback does not dictate any particular answer to that
question. The precedent fallback deals with the respect that should be
given to judicial precedents when they are relevant to the case at hand.
It has no necessary implications for the validity of political
constructions when the courts have not yet spoken.251
The second issue raised by political constructions is whether
they can trump contrary judicial constructions. Once again, those who
urge a historical focus will answer the question by using historical
evidence to determine which type of construction was paramount. By
contrast, for those who believe that historical analysis is improper or
insufficient for choosing between political and judicial constructions,
the choice will depend on normative commitments. Commentators such
248. See supra Part V.
249. See Nelson, supra note 5, at 528–29 n.38:
Some members of the founding generation . . . thought that the political branches (and,
by extension, the people themselves) should have exclusive responsibility for settling
the Constitution’s indeterminacies, and that courts should play no role in this
process. . . . Other members of the founding generation favored a larger judicial role.
250. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560 (2014) (quoting
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819) and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)); see also id. (“[The Court’s] precedents show that this Court has treated
practice as an important interpretive factor even when the nature or longevity of that practice is
subject to dispute, and even when that practice began after the founding era.”).
251. The calculus may be different for those who emphasize original methods of responding
to constitutional uncertainty; for them, the proper approach would depend on historical evidence
about the validity of political constructions.
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as Keith Whittington have prioritized political constructions over
judicial ones for reasons related to popular sovereignty.252 I have
suggested an alternative approach of prioritizing judicial precedent in
order to promote impersonality and doctrinal stability.253 On the
account that I have offered, judicial precedents should receive at least
a presumption of deference notwithstanding the subsequent emergence
of contrary legislative constructions. But the presumption need not be
absolute, and among the factors relevant to its defeasibility may be the
value of upholding political constructions.254
VII. REMAINING CONCERNS
The previous Parts examined the precedent fallback as an
intrinsic component of originalist interpretation and as a principle of
constitutional construction. In this Part, I discuss three lingering
concerns that apply across both contexts. The first is that by deferring
to originalist and nonoriginalist precedents alike, originalist judges
may unintentionally contribute to the marginalization of originalist
jurisprudence. The second question is that a norm of strong deference
to precedent would give judges too much discretion to issue sweeping
edicts on the understanding that subsequent courts must follow suit.
The third relates to the difficulty of making the threshold
determination whether evidence of the Constitution’s original meaning
is clear enough to resolve a dispute without resort to the precedent
fallback.
A. The Ratchet Problem
Imagine an originalist judge who is inclined to defer to
precedents regardless of the style of reasoning they embody. The judge
thinks it proper to follow precedents that reflect an attempt to discern
the Constitution’s original meaning. But she also sees value in
deferring, on stare decisis grounds, to precedents that treat the original
meaning as subordinate to considerations such as policy and justice.
Nevertheless, the judge worries that her contemporaries and successors

252. See Strang, supra note 76, at 1785 (offering a “tentative conclusion” that “originalist
precedent that constructs constitutional law is subject to defeasance by the elected branches”) ;
Whittington, supra note 126, at 129 (“[M]any political actors may welcome the courts stepping in
to construct constitutional meaning, resolve indeterminacies, and maintain consensual values in
specific cases. The difficulty arises, however, when that process becomes less consensual and power
and influence shifts into the courts.”).
253. See supra Part V.
254. See supra Part VI.
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who embrace competing interpretive philosophies will not be so
charitable in their treatment of precedent. Her specific concern is that
even if originalists defer to precedents without regard to interpretive
methodology, nonoriginalists will refuse to reciprocate. In the worstcase (for originalists) scenario, the result would be what Professor
Solum has called a “ratchet” effect through which originalist precedents
are frequently overruled by nonoriginalists while nonoriginalist
precedents are commonly reaffirmed by originalists.255 This danger may
suggest that the precedent fallback should be reconsidered, at least
insofar as it fails to distinguish between originalist and nonoriginalist
decisions.
In assessing this concern, it is important to recognize that the
precedent fallback applies only when there is no conflict between
judicial precedent and the Constitution’s original meaning. The extent
of the ratchet problem, by contrast, depends on the role of precedent
when the Constitution’s meaning is clear. A judge might adopt a
fallback rule of deference to precedent while concluding that all conflicts
between precedent and original meaning should be resolved in favor of
the latter. That approach would alleviate the ratchet problem because
nonoriginalist precedents would never trump the Constitution’s
discernible commands. Alternatively, the judge might conclude that, in
some situations, even clear constitutional meaning should yield to
contrary precedent. Whether such an approach would move
constitutional jurisprudence away from originalism depends on the
circumstances in which precedent could trump original meaning.
Defining those circumstances, in turn, depends on the particular
version of originalism that is being applied. Hence the discussion in
Part III, above, which explained how different strands of originalism
entail distinctive rules for when judicial precedents can legitimately
displace the Constitution’s original meaning.256
It is one’s view of the status of precedent when it conflicts with
original meaning that determines the acuteness of the ratchet concern.
If originalists uphold precedents that deviate from the Constitution’s
original meaning in a wide array of situations, the originalist project
may indeed find itself in jeopardy. If originalists instead choose to
restrict the situations in which clear textual and historical evidence will
yield to contrary case law, the Constitution’s original meaning will
remain intact. In neither case does the precedent fallback exacerbate
the ratchet problem.
255. Cf. Solum, supra note 48, at 193 (“If formalists respect precedent and there are
alternating periods of realism and formalism, then we have a ratchet.”).
256. See supra Part III.
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B. Constraint Tomorrow But Discretion Today?
Using precedent to constrain later judges has implications for
earlier ones. Asking judges to defer to prior opinions affords some
degree of “lawmaking power” to their predecessors.257 This fact should
give us pause. Perhaps the infusion of precedent with binding force
simply reallocates discretion between the courts of the past and present,
without any meaningful impact on the amount of discretion coursing
through the judicial branch. Or perhaps the effect is even worse,
inflating the lawmaking power of earlier judges beyond the
countervailing reduction in the discretion of their successors. The
severity of this problem depends on the issue of precedential scope—
that is, the universe of propositions for which a precedent is treated as
binding authority.258 At the heart of the matter is the recognition that
a judicial opinion can be relevant for (much) more than its narrow
result. Drawing a line between the parts of an opinion that require
deference and the parts that are dispensable is crucial to the allocation
of judicial power across time.259
Under a broad conception of precedential scope, courts must
defer to a wide array of prior judicial statements, provided that the
statements include indicia of deliberation rather than appearing as “by
the way” asides.260 Such an approach can be highly constraining of later
courts but also highly empowering of earlier ones. The alternative is to
define precedents more narrowly, for instance, by deferring only to the
core ruling that was necessary to resolve a particular dispute.261 That
approach limits the power of earlier judges to imbue their declarations
with forward-looking effect, but it also reduces the constraining force of
precedent on future judges.262 And, of course, there are numerous
options between these poles.

257. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1249, 1250 (2006).
258. See Kozel, supra note 70, at 180–81 (defining the problem of precedential scope and
distinguishing it from the problem of precedential strength).
259. See id. at 181–82.
260. See, e.g., Schwab v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2006) (drawing a distinction
between “subordinate clause, negative pregnant, devoid-of-analysis, throw-away kind of dicta” and
“well thought out, thoroughly reasoned, and carefully articulated analysis”).
261. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 787 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc) (Boggs, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “the holding/dicta distinction demands that we consider binding only that
which was necessary to resolve the question before the [Supreme] Court”), aff’d, 539 U.S. 306
(2003).
262. See Kozel, supra note 70, at 204–11 (discussing the implications of theories of
precedential scope for the degree to which judges are constrained).
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The precedent fallback does not demand any single theory of
precedential scope. It does, however, imply certain baseline principles
regarding the nature of the judicial role. In order to respect the
pronouncements of their predecessors and reinforce the ideal of a
unified court working across time, judges must not distort or
marginalize prior resolutions of disputed legal questions.263 Nor may
they seize upon immaterial factual distinctions. Instead, a judge should
treat the rule of decision contained in a precedent “as a genuine legal
norm to which the court that he belongs to has already committed
itself.”264 It is that type of mindset that establishes a court as “an
institution that decides cases on a general basis” rather than “an
institutional environment in which individuals make particularized
case-by-case determinations.”265 Moreover, it might well be that
supplementary principles—such as the virtues of a restrained approach
to judging that is conscious of the drawbacks of broad rulemaking—
should inform the creation of precedent in the first instance. This need
for supplementation is unremarkable, for stare decisis does not work
alone. It is part of a dynamic set of interpretive and institutional
considerations that define the enterprise of constitutional adjudication.
C. Defining Constitutional Clarity
The precedent fallback applies when the Constitution’s original
meaning is uncertain. A pivotal question is where the bar for
constitutional certainty—or, in the common parlance of the
interpretation-construction debate, constitutional determinacy—
should be set. If the Constitution’s original meaning is deemed to be
uncertain whenever one interpretation is more likely than the others,
the occasions for falling back on precedent will be relatively rare; the
fallback rule’s operation would be limited to situations in which the
evidence supporting multiple interpretations is equally compelling. If,
by comparison, the original meaning is treated as controlling only when
the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that an
interpretation is accurate, there will be frequent invocations of
precedent as a response to constitutional uncertainty. As Gary Lawson
has put it, “it does no good to have a methodology for interpreting a text
unless one also knows when it is time to declare epistemological victory
or defeat and move on.”266
263. See id. at 188–90 (discussing instances in which the Supreme Court has marginalized
“its past expressions by depicting them as peripheral or overbroad”).
264. Waldron, supra note 31, at 23.
265. Id.
266. Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 N W. U. L. REV. 859, 859 (1992).
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The most important takeaway for present purposes is that the
precedent fallback is compatible with either a low bar or a high bar for
proving the Constitution’s original meaning. A judge can fall back on
precedent in cases of constitutional uncertainty regardless of how the
concept of uncertainty is defined. In addition, it may be appropriate to
alter the operative standard for constitutional certainty depending on
whether an issue is a matter of first impression. In grappling with a
thorny constitutional question, a judge might be inclined to fall back on
a long line of relevant precedents instead of applying—notwithstanding
her substantial doubts about its correctness—the interpretation that
she deems most likely. Yet in the absence of a relevant precedent, that
same judge might conclude that the best course is to apply her
understanding of the Constitution’s original meaning despite her
concerns. Such an approach can enhance continuity by avoiding
interpretive fluctuations when the proper interpretation of the
Constitution is subject to reasonable dispute.
Finally, it warrants reiterating that even when the
Constitution’s original meaning is inadequate to dictate the result to a
particular question, fidelity to original meaning will nevertheless
demonstrate the implausibility of some interpretations. A judge who
begins with an inquiry into original meaning will always be left with a
narrowed set of choices.267 By selecting among the plausible options
against the backdrop of deference to precedent, judges can minimize the
dangers of individual discretion while preserving a primary
commitment to the Constitution’s original meaning—wherever the bar
for constitutional certainty is set.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Rather than defending or challenging originalism as a general
matter, this Article has dealt with one particular aspect of the
methodology: its handling of judicial precedent. I have tried to show
that originalism does not suffer from an inherent inability to leverage
the value of precedent. Through a fallback rule of deference to precedent
in situations of constitutional uncertainty, originalism and judicial case
law can work hand in hand. The legitimacy of such a fallback rule is
important, I have claimed, because evaluating originalism depends in
part on what happens when the Constitution’s text and context are
insufficient to resolve a case.
267. Cf. Nelson, supra note 48, at 4 (“[E]xternal sources of law will often be indeterminate
and incomplete; they will leave considerable room for judicial discretion. But unless they are
wholly indeterminate, they will still tend to produce some degree of consistency in judicial
decisions.”).
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Of course, originalists do not need to make room for judicial
precedent in articulating their vision of the constitutional order. Yet
they can be faithful to precedent while remaining consistent in their
commitment to the Constitution’s text. Robert Bork once asserted that
“those who adhere to a philosophy of original understanding are more
likely to respect precedent than those who do not.”268 Though I will not
speculate about whether his statement was (or is) correct as a
descriptive matter, the statement is sound to the extent it suggests that
concerns about continuity and stability motivate originalism and stare
decisis alike. Reasonable minds may differ over the ultimate merits of
originalism. But in evaluating originalism’s validity as an interpretive
philosophy, it is important to recognize the role that judicial precedent
can play.

268. BORK, supra note 6, at 159.

